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Problem Description 
This study examines valuation of early stage USOs using traditional valuation methods as well as 
the feasibility of a resource-based valuation framework.  
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This study is the master thesis of Arif Mirza and Ole Rønning, two graduate M.Sc. students at the 
NTNU School of Entrepreneurship. The motivation behind the chosen research topic is grounded 
in both authors’ background in entrepreneurship, and more precisely their personal experience 
with the difficulties associated with valuing young startups. Further on, the focus on university 
spinoffs (USOs) was a natural development due to the authors residing in the technological capital 
of Norway, Trondheim, which is the originating region of many of Norway’s USOs. 
 
The purpose of this research is to shed light on the limitations associated with today’s valuation 
methods used in the context of USOs, as well as establish the initial theoretical foundation for an 
alternative valuation approach that might be better for this type of firms. The research is presented 
in two separate articles. The work has provided the authors with deep knowledge about valuing 
new ventures, and the phenomena of university spinoffs.  Further on, the empirical analysis 
provided the authors an opportunity to expand on their limited statistical knowledge. Through this 
the authors have learned statistical tools we are certain will be useful as we venture into our 
business careers. As a final remark, it has become evident to the authors that today’s valuation 
methods have significant shortcomings when used in the context of USOs, and that the findings in 
this study do indeed fill a gap in the literature on both valuation and university spinoffs. 
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Summary 
During the last three decades, there has been a significant growth in the establishment of university spin-
offs (USOs), and they have become an important part of the economic landscape. These are companies 
where it is generally agreed upon that financing is essential in their early stages, yet who face difficulties 
in raising the necessary capital. This is believed to be due to long development times, and large amounts of 
uncertainty which makes these companies difficult to value. This master thesis is divided into two articles, 
where the first examines the applicability of traditional valuation methods on USOs, and the second seeks 
to investigate the feasibility of a valuation framework based on resource inputs, rather than financial 
outputs. Together, these two articles aim to lay the foundation on which future research can build to 
develop better valuation methods, and through this make it easier for investors to assess early stage 
university spin-offs and close the financing gap these companies face.  
Through article 1, the authors investigate, with a basis in a two dimensional theoretical framework based 
on resource-based theory and risk and uncertainty, how unique resource characteristics in these firms 
affect the perceived uncertainty seen from the viewpoint of an investor, and subsequently how this 
uncertainty affects the applicability of traditional valuation methods from corporate finance. It is found 
that the early-stage, radicalness and significant technical advances of the technologies many of these 
companies are founded on lead to high fundamental uncertainty, which renders the three most common 
valuation methods cash flow discounting, balance sheet and income statement inapplicable to early stage 
USOs.  This has important implications for investors, who by blindly using these methods on USOs can 
make bad investment decisions, or forego valuable investment opportunities. 
In light of the findings in article 1, article 2 investigates the feasibility of a resource-based valuation 
framework, with the underlying argument that when it is difficult to value a company with a basis in 
financial outputs used in traditional corporate finance, a method based on inputs identified through theories 
from strategic management that help predict and explain superior firm performance may prove more 
satisfactory. Followingly, a conceptual framework with a basis in resource-based theory is developed. To 
test the framework, six hypotheses about the relationship between initial resource endowments in USOs, 
and their long term equity value are formulated, and empirically tested through regression on a sample of 
63 Norwegian USOs. It is found that, ceteris paribus, higher degrees of heterogeneity in the founding team, 
better quality parent universities as well as more filed and published patents in the early stages of USO are 
all positively related to the firms long term equity value. With a basis in this it is argued that USOs who 
exhibit these resource characteristics in their early stages should be valued higher than those that do not.  
This has implications for investors, who should take into consideration the particular resources a firm 
holds in their value estimates, and for entrepreneurs who should seek to assemble specific resources to 
increase the future value of their firm. Although the development of a complete valuation model was 
outside of the articles scope, the conceptual valuation framework developed proves that a resource-based 
valuation framework has potential, and future research efforts should be directed towards this topic. 
!
Sammendrag 
Oppstartsbedrifter med opphav fra universitetsforskning(USOs) har de siste årene vokst betydelig i antall, 
og blitt en viktig del av det økonomiske landskapet. Dette er bedrifter hvor det generelt er enighet i at 
kapital er spesielt viktig i tidligfase, men som møter store utfordringer i å innhente den nødvendige 
kapitalen. Dette er til dels grunnet lange utviklingstider, og vanskeligheter for investorer i å vurdere 
verdiene til disse selskapene. Denne masteroppgaven er delt i to artikler, hvor artikkel 1 undersøker 
hvorvidt eksisterende verdsettelsesmetoder i en tilfredsstillende grad kan brukes til å finne verdien av 
tidligfase USOs. Artikkel 2 undersøker muligheten for å utvikle et verdsettelsesrammeverk basert på 
ressurser i selskapet. Sammen søker disse to artiklene å fylle forskningsmangelen på verdsettelse av disse 
spesielle selskapene, og danne grunnlaget for utvikling av mer robuste verdsettelsesmetoder som letter 
verdivurderingen, og videre kapitaltilgangen fra investorer.  
Gjennom artikkel 1 søker forfatterne, med utgangspunkt i et todimensjonalt teoretiskrammeverk bygd på 
ressursbasert teori og risiko og usikkerhet, å identifisere hva som gjør disse selskapene unike, hvordan 
disse unike karakteristikkene påvirker usikkerheten knyttet til USOs sett fra en investorsståsted, og til slutt 
hvordan dette igjen påvirker muligheten for å bruke tradisjonelle verdsettelsesmetoder. For å svare på disse 
spørsmålene gjennomføres det et litteratursøk på både verdsetting og ressurser i USOs. Resultatene viser  
at spesielt tre karakteristikker ved de teknologiske ressursene i tidligfase USOs, nemlig teknologiens 
tidlige utviklingsstadium, dens radikale natur samt signifikante tekniske fremskritt, øker den fundamentale 
usikkerheten i selskapene, noe som gjør det umulig å på en pålitelig måte estimere finansielle data 
tradisjonelle verdsettelsesmetoder er avhengig av. Dette fører til at de har begrenset anvendbarhet på disse 
selskapene. Dette har viktige implikasjoner for investorer, som ved å blindt bruke disse metodene kan 
gjennomføre dårlige investeringer, eller gå glipp av gode investeringsobjekt.  
I lys av funnene i artikkel 1, undersøker artikkel 2 muligheten for å utvikle et verdsettelsesrammeverk 
basert på ressurser i selskapet i stedet for finansielle data, med den underliggende logikken at når det er 
vanskelig å estimere fremtidig ytelse kan muligens en metode med fundament i teorier som forklarer og 
spår ytelse føre til bedre resultater. Et konseptuelt verdsettelsesrammeverk for sammenhengen mellom 
ressurser og selskapsverdi utvikles. For å teste rammeverket utvikles seks hypoteser med utgangspunkt i 
ressurs-ytelsessammenhenger i USOs påvist i tidligere forskning. Disse hypotesene testes  gjennom 
regresjon på et datasett bestående av 63 norske USOs. Resultatene indikerer at USOs som i tidligfase har 
mer heterogene oppstartsteam, som har opphav i universiteter av høyere kvalitet, og som har flere 
publiserte og søkte patenter, har, gitt at alt annet holds konstant, høyere verdi i lengden. Det argumenteres 
følgelig for at USOs som har disse ressurskarateristikkene i tidligfase bør verdsettes høyere enn selskaper 
som ikke har de. Dette har  implikasjoner for investorer, som i sine verdivurderinger kan bihensyna 
ressurser i selskapene, og for grundere som bør søke å sample visse ressurser for å øke verdien på 
selskapet sitt. Selv om utviklingen av et komplett verdsettelsesrammeverk er utenfor omfanget til 
artikkelen, og resultatene kun indikativen, tyder de på at verdsetting basert på ressurser kan være 
hensiktsmessig. For å verifisere dette er det nødvendig med betydelig fremtidig forskningsfokus på temaet. 
!
  
Examining Equity Valuation of University Spin-
off Companies: A Literature Review 
Arif M. Mirza, Ole Rønning 
ABSTRACT 
University spinoffs have in the last three decades grown considerably in numbers, and have become an 
important part of the economic landscape. This study investigates how unique characteristics of initial 
resource endowments of these firms affect the applicability of traditional valuation methods from 
corporate finance. To answer the research question, a two-dimensional theoretical framework consisting of 
risk and uncertainty and resource-based theory is used. As an empirical foundation, literature reviews on 
both valuation and university spinoffs are conducted. Our findings show that the three most common 
groups of valuation methods, i.e. cash flow discounting, balance sheet and income statement, are not 
applicable to early-stage USOs. This is primarily due to the technologies these companies are founded on 
being early-stage, radical and providing significant technical advances, which leads to high fundamental 
uncertainty. This uncertainty makes it difficult to reliably estimate financial variables on which traditional 
valuation methods are dependent. The findings have particular implications for investors, who by blindly 
using traditional valuation methods can overlook interesting prospects or make poor investment decisions. 
Introduction 
There has been a notable increase in technology 
transfer from universities to the industry in the 
last decades (Rothaermel et al., 2007). From 
1980 to 1993, American academic institutions 
saw an increase of 444 percent in the 
establishment of university spinoff companies 
(USOs) (Pressman, 2002). The US Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980 and its European counterparts, a rise 
in venture capital, a larger pool and thus mobility 
of scientists and engineers, and important 
technological breakthroughs in computing are 
some of the factors attributed to this growth. Not 
surprisingly, these significant developments in 
establishment of university spinoffs, and their 
potential economic impacts, have attracted an 
increasing attention of research towards the 
phenomenon both in the United States and in 
Europe (Rothaermel et al., 2007). 
Some of this research has been on the topic of 
financing of early-stage USOs, and more 
specifically, the lack thereof. The majority of 
startups require access to financing to develop 
their products and services, and obtain growth. 
However, researchers have argued that 
financing, and specifically early-stage financing, 
might be more crucial for USOs compared to the 
average start-up (Shane, 2004; Clarysse and 
Bruneel, 2007). Despite the need for early-stage 
financing, USOs face an impediment in razing 
the necessary capital due to high levels of 
uncertainty associated with these ventures 
(Widding et al., 2009; Shane, 2004). 
“Finance is a catalyst of this 
wealth creation yet access to 
venture capital is a major 
impediment faced by these 
companies” 
– Wright et al. (2006) 
An important step in obtaining financing for a 
new venture is determining its value. Tyebjee 
and Bruno (1984) maintain that establishing the 
price of venture capital is the heart of any 
negotiation between the founders of the venture 
and potential investors. To determine the price, 
valuation becomes essential, and common 
valuation methods have traditionally been 
dependent on future cash flows, assets or 
valuations of comparative firms (Seppä and 
Laamanen, 2001). A fundamental assumption 
underlying these methods is that there is an 
efficient capital market for ownership in the firm 
(Timmons and Spinelli, 2004), i.e. that 
informational asymmetries are uncommon 
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(Fama, 1991) and that asset prices therefore 
reflect all publicly known information. For 
publically traded firms this assumption may 
hold, but for new ventures with a lack of 
liquidity of ownership, short operating history 
and limited/private accounting information, 
informational asymmetries between the investor 
and firm can be large, and it does not. Timmons 
and Spinelli (2004) argue that it is this 
inefficiency in the venture capital market that 
makes the most common valuation methods 
prone to error when used on early-stage 
companies, because estimating cash flows and 
discount rates becomes difficult. In agreement 
with Timmons and Spinelli (2004), Damodaran 
(2009) points out that young companies are 
problematic to value due to operating losses or 
small revenues, multiple claims on equity, the 
fact that they are illiquid investments and that it 
is difficult to account for the risk of the company 
not surviving. 
The factors leading to inefficiency highlighted 
by Timmons and Spinelli (2004) are especially 
prevalent in USOs, whom lately have become an 
important part of the economic landscape 
through the creation of jobs and encouraging 
local economic development (Shane, 2004; 
Bonardo et al., 2011). This is a type of company 
where it is generally agreed upon that the 
financial needs are greater than those of other 
firms and that capital is essential for growth 
(Cohen, 2006; Neck et al., 2004; Sætre et al., 
2006; Clarysse and Bruneel, 2007), yet Shane 
(2004) states that they have difficulty in raising 
capital in their early stages. This may partially be 
attributed to problems in valuing these 
companies. As Keeley et al. (1996) writes, 
valuation is a central part in deciding whether 
one should invest in a company or not, but with 
indications that these firms take on average 10 
years before reaching the market (Rasmussen et 
al., 2013; Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006), liquidity 
of ownership is a major issue. With many of 
these companies being founded on research with 
nothing more than a proof of concept (Shane, 
2004) it takes years before operating history is 
available. Further on, advanced and complex 
technologies increase informational asymmetries 
between the USO and possible investors (Shane, 
2004). As Rasmussen et al. (2013) points out, 
USOs face significant uncertainty in their early 
stages due to unproven technology, uncertainty 
about market need and organizational 
uncertainty. Valuing such a company obviously 
poses new challenges, since parameters that 
traditionally have been emphasized are cash 
flows and discount rates, which become 
increasingly difficult to estimate under higher 
uncertainty. 
This is what motivates this study. Blindly using 
existing valuation methods for the lack of better 
approaches might yield significantly misleading 
valuations, leading investors to make bad 
investment decisions or generally refrain from 
investing in early-stage USOs to avoid the risk of 
inadequately assessing their investment projects. 
A better understanding of how to value these 
firms might help solve this problem. 
Consequently we raise the following research 
question: 
RQ: How do characteristics of 
initial resource endowments in 
USOs affect the suitability of using 
traditional valuation methods? 
In order to answer the research question, we 
draw upon resource-based theory as well as the 
theory of risk and uncertainty. The logic being 
that the former helps us to identify the firm 
characteristics that make these companies 
unique, and the latter to assess how these 
characteristics affect the inherent difficulties in 
assessing the risk in early-stage USOs, and 
subsequently the difficulties in using traditional 
valuation methods. In the next part we introduce 
the theoretical framework underlying this study 
before we present the research methodology 
employed. In the subsequent literature review we 
present relevant literature on both traditional 
valuation methods as well as resource 
characteristics of early stage USOs. Finally we 
discuss how these initial resource characteristics 
affect the applicability of traditional valuation 
methods, and what implications this has for 
investors and entrepreneurs. 
Definition of Early-Stage University 
Based Spinoffs 
In the literature on university spinoffs there have 
been nearly as many names to the phenomenon 
as there have been researchers studying it. 
Authors have for example referred to these 
companies as university startups (Criaco et al., 
2013; Powers and McDougall, 2005) or 
university-based startups (Marion et al., 2012), 
as university spinoffs (Bigliardi et al., 2013; 
Wright et al., 2012), new technology-based firms 
(Fuller and Rothaermel, 2012), research-based 
scientific organizations (Mustar et al., 2006), 
academic spinoffs (Clarysse et al., 2007; Festel, 
2013) and academic startups (Colombo and Piva, 
2012). Defining the phenomenon has been 
equally inconsistent. Some definitions restrict the 
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term to those companies where the intellectual 
property is transferred from the university to the 
new venture (Shane, 2004; Lockett et al., 2005), 
others also include companies founded on 
knowledge obtained at the parent university 
(Rappert et al., 1999), such as consultancy 
companies. 
In this study, university spinoffs are defined as 
companies that involve transfer of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) to the new venture, and that 
are either developed by faculty members based 
on their own research, or created specifically to 
capitalize on academic research. This definition 
is keeping with the literature (Shane, 2004; 
Colombo et al., 2010; Lockett et al., 2005), and 
is chosen because firms that involve transfer of 
IPR are more likely to have larger financial 
needs, to seek funding in their early stages, and 
followingly are more impacted by issues related 
to valuation, than for example consultancy 
companies founded on implicit knowledge 
developed at the parent university. Further on, 
we are interested in investigating early stage 
valuation, and therefore focus on early-stage 
USOs. Vohora et al. (2002) finds that USOs 
develop in five distinct phases: the research 
phase, opportunity framing phase, pre-
organization phase, re-orientation phase and 
finally sustainable returns phase. The research 
phase is where the intellectual property is 
created, and is prior to any commercialization. 
The opportunity framing phase includes 
screening of the technology with regards to 
validity and performance, and research to prove 
that the technology works outside the laboratory. 
Vohora et al. (2002) writes that a fundamental 
problem at this stage is that there is a mismatch 
between what the university offers, and what 
venture capitalists want. The new ventures have 
little proof of concept, no target market or 
commercial management, and generally lacking 
resources to further develop the opportunity. It is 
followingly in this stage that the financing gap 
(Shane, 2004) starts to develop, and where the 
problems of valuation become relevant. We 
therefore focus on USOs in this stage of 
development, and define them as early-stage 
USOs. 
Theoretical Framework 
The topic of valuation is traditionally a field 
within corporate finance, and most valuation 
methods are, to some extent, based on 
accounting information. Valuing any startup 
using these common methods is an inherently 
difficult task (Timmons and Spinelli, 2004; 
Damodaran, 2009), and to investigate whether 
the valuation of early-stage USOs indeed is a 
special case, it becomes necessary to understand 
what makes these firms unique. To investigate 
this the authors use resource-based theory as the 
theoretical context to identify the unique 
resource characteristics of these firms.  As Miller 
(2003) writes, resources are the ‘raw material’ of 
business strategy, and therefore provide the basis 
on which firms can distinguish themselves from 
others. However, simply identifying these 
differences will not be adequate to assess the 
applicability of common valuation methods on 
early stage USOs. The underlying factor making 
valuation of new ventures difficult is uncertainty, 
which in the context of valuation becomes 
important to clearly separate from risk. To 
understand this, we use the notion of risk and 
uncertainty as the second dimension in the 
theoretical framework. 
Risk, Uncertainty and Informational 
Asymmetries 
Knight (1921) defines the concepts of risk and 
uncertainty as two distinct variables based on 
three categories of probabilities: A priori 
probability, statistical probability and estimates. 
A priori probabilities are derived from absolutely 
homogenous classification of instances, for 
example as the case in a dice throw. Statistical 
probability on the other hand is obtained through 
analysis: “it is an empirical evaluation of the 
frequency of association between predicates…” 
(Knight, 1921). Lastly, estimates are a group of 
probabilities for which there is no valid basis of 
any kind for classifying instances. It is this last 
category of probabilities that Knight defines as 
uncertainty, while the former two are defined as 
risk. 
“The practical difference between 
the two categories, risk and 
uncertainty, is that in the former the 
distribution of the outcome in a 
group of instances is known (either 
through calculation a priori or 
from statistics of past experience), 
while in the case of uncertainty this 
is not true, the reason being in 
general that it is impossible to form 
a group of instances, because the 
situation dealt with is in a high 
degree unique.” 
– Knight (1921) 
Dequech (2000) further distinguishes between 
fundamental uncertainty and ambiguity. What 
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Dequech defines as fundamental uncertainty is in 
accordance with Knight’s definition of 
uncertainty. However, he goes on to argue that 
one has to distinguish between fundamental 
uncertainty and ambiguity, where he defines 
ambiguity in accordance with Camerer and 
Weber (1992): 
“Ambiguity is uncertainty about 
probability, created by missing 
information that is relevant and 
could be known. Ambiguity is 
therefore not uncertainty about the 
possible outcomes, but rather lack 
of certainty about probabilities of 
outcomes being 1, 0 or something 
in between. Information is hidden, 
rather than non-existent at the 
moment of decision” 
 – Dequech (2000) 
Ambiguity therefore, can lead to situations of 
asymmetric information.Asymmetric 
information denotes a situation in which one 
contracting party has superior information 
compared to another, and has consequences 
whenever a “principal”, who must contract with 
an “agent” to accomplish some purpose, cannot 
be sure how well the agent will perform because 
the agent’s effort cannot be determined ex ante 
(Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993). This can lead to 
adverse selection, or a “lemons” problem 
(Akerlof, 1970). Adverse selection refers to a 
situation in which superior information is used to 
conduct immoral behavior prior to a transaction, 
and Shane and Cable (2002) points out that this 
often results in difficulties for entrepreneurs to 
obtain financing from investors because they 
possess information about themselves and their 
opportunities that potential investors do not 
(Chan et al., 1990; Gompers, 1995). More 
specifically, entrepreneurs are reluctant to 
disclose all information regarding their 
opportunity because it will make it easier for 
other people to pursue the same opportunity, 
which results in the investor receiving less 
information. Additionally, because of the 
superior information, entrepreneurs can engage 
in opportunistic behavior (Shane and Cable, 
2002). Consequently, Venkataraman (1997) 
writes that investors require the entrepreneur to 
make large, irreversible and credible 
commitments to the venture, which drives up the 
entrepreneurs sunk cost, and drives high-quality 
entrepreneurs from the market. This is what 
Akerlof (1970) denotes the “lemons” problem, 
namely that only undesirable deals will be 
available to investors. Figure 1 depicts the 
relationship between risk, ambiguity, 
informational asymmetries, and fundamental 
uncertainty, where an upwards movement on the 
Y-axis denotes increasing uncertainty, while a 
downwards movement indicates increasing risk. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between risk, fundamental 
uncertainty, ambiguity and informational asymmetries. 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty, as 
well as informational asymmetries, is 
particularly relevant for USOs. It is generally 
accepted that as a venture moves to later stages 
of development, the accompanied risk and 
uncertainty associated with that firm reduces 
(Seppä and Laamanen, 2001). Shane (2004) 
defines early-stage USOs as being at a “minus 
two” development stage, naturally leading to 
extraordinary high uncertainty, and Wright et al. 
(2006) state that informational asymmetries may 
be particularly significant in new high-tech 
firms. This has important implications for the 
suitability of traditional valuation methods – a 
discussion visited later in this study. 
Resource-Based Theory 
In the 1959 resource-based view seminal text 
“The theory of the growth of the firm”, Edith T. 
Penrose introduces the notion of the firm as a 
bundle of resources, and establishes causal links 
between unique firm resources and capabilities, 
and superior firm-level performance compared to 
rivals (Kor and Mahoney, 2004). Wernerfelt 
(1984) writes that from a company's point of 
view, resources and products are two sides of the 
same coin, arguing that performance is directly 
affected by products, but indirectly (and 
primarily) it is driven by the resources that go 
into producing them. He defined resources as 
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“anything that could be thought of as a strength 
or weakness for a given firm...”. In the 1991 
article, Jay Barney expanded the definition of 
resources to include “all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge etc. controlled by the 
firm that enable it to conceive of and implement 
strategies that improve efficiency and 
effectiveness”. 
Building on the general assumption in resource-
based theory that resources and capabilities are 
heterogeneous across firms, Barney (1991) 
argues that sustained competitive advantages are 
derived from the resources a company controls 
that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable 
(VRIN) and non-substitutable. Valuable in the 
sense that they enable the firm to implement 
strategies that improve its efficiency and 
effectiveness (Barney, 1991). Rare implying that 
the resources must be scarce relative to demand. 
Firms that possess resources that are both 
valuable and rare often have the first mover 
advantage. However, to be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage, they must also be 
imperfectly imitable, i.e. that other firms cannot 
copy them, and non-substitutable, meaning that 
other resources cannot be used to implement 
equivalent strategies (Barney, 1991). 
Underpinning this, Crook et al. 
(2008), conducting a meta-analysis on resources 
and performance, find that resources that meet 
the VRIN criteria are more strongly related to 
performance that those that do not. Scholars have 
however highlighted that the link between 
resources and performance is not only dependent 
on the former being VRIN, but also on the 
organization's ability to capture the economic 
value that they can create (Barney and Clark, 
2007). Mahoney and Pandian (1992) establish 
the missing link between resources and their 
utilization, and write that it is not merely the 
resources themselves that lead to competitive 
advantages, but rather the company’s distinct 
competencies in using the resources better than 
competitors. 
Building on the same principle as Mahoney and 
Pandian (1992), Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) 
argue that it is through entrepreneurship and the 
entrepreneurial process of discovering, 
understanding market opportunities, and 
coordinating knowledge that inputs become 
heterogeneous outputs. Brush et al. (2001) write 
that entrepreneurs must first assemble resources, 
and then combine and develop them into 
resources that will yield distinctive capabilities. 
Their ability to accomplish this will be 
dependent on individual experiences, educational 
backgrounds, social ties, initial financial capital, 
or cognitive ability to combine concepts and 
information into new ideas. Further on, they 
write that initial resource decisions made by the 
entrepreneur has significant implications for 
survival and growth. Brush et al. (2001) go on to 
define six categories of resources in new 
ventures: human, social, financial, physical, 
technology, and organizational. Among these, 
human, technological, social and financial 
resources are highlighted as important for 
research-based spinoffs (Mustar et al., 2006). 
Human resources refer to the people in the 
company: attributes and experience of the 
founding team, the management team and 
personnel (Brush et al., 2001). According to the 
upper echelon argument, new venture 
performance, growth and success can be tied to 
the individual attributes of the companies 
managerial group (Visintin and Pittino, 2014; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
Social resources refer to the network of the 
company, i.e. partners, industry and financial 
contacts of the founders (Brush et al., 2001). 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) write that 
all action, including economic action, is 
embedded in a social fabric of opportunities, and 
that interaction, and ultimately cooperation, is 
likely to happen among people who know one 
another. Such alliances can prove to be critical 
resources (Hamel et al., 1989; Pisano and Teece, 
1989) when firms are undertaking expensive or 
risky strategies, as well as provide legitimacy 
and market power (Wiewel and Hunter, 1985; 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Baum and Oliver, 1991) that 
improve strategic position. Stuart et al. (1999) 
write that third parties, such as investors and 
employees, rely on the relationships of young 
companies to assess their quality, and that young 
companies “supported” by prominent 
relationships are more likely to perform well. 
This is because resource holders trust the ability 
of well-regarded organizations or individuals to 
assess quality under ambiguous circumstances 
(Stuart, 1998), and that this “signaling effect” 
subsequently mitigates the risks of alliance 
formation such as poor implementation, 
opportunism, and appropriation of knowledge 
(Larson, 1992). Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
(1996) go on to write that the advantages of top 
managers social resources are particularly 
critical for young firms, because they have not 
had the time to establish firm-level networks. 
Financial resources refer of the amount and type 
of funding a spinoff has received (Brush et al., 
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2001). Brüderl et al. (1992) write that financial 
resources can act as buffers against random 
shocks, and Cooper et al. (1994) that capital 
allows entrepreneurs to learn and overcome 
problems. Financial capital additionally enables 
firms to pursue a broader range of activities as 
well as more ambitious projects (Westhead et al., 
2001). 
Finally, technological resources refer to the 
company’s products and technology (Borch et 
al., 1999), as well as technical knowledge 
associated with the two (Burgers et al., 2008), 
and intellectual property. Malerba and Orsenigo 
(1993) write that the factors related to the 
endowed technological knowledge have an 
impact on the success of companies, and Shane 
and Cable (2002) that the strength of a firms 
technological endowments at founding is an 
important predictor of its subsequent 
performance. 
With a basis in the above presented theory, the 
overarching argument that is employed in this 
study is that resource-based theory can be 
leveraged to identify unique characteristics to 
USOs. Further on, the distinction between risk 
and uncertainty is used to analyze how these 
unique resource characteristics affect the 
perceived risk and uncertainty in a USO, and 
followingly how this affects the applicability of 
traditional valuation methods. Figure 2 
summarizes the theoretical framework. 
Methodology 
The research methodology employed in this 
study consists of a semi-structured literature 
search on valuation methods, as well as a 
structured search on academic entrepreneurship 
and USOs.  The main results from the integrative 
reviews (Cooper, 1988) are presented in the next 
chapter. In this chapter the authors outline the 
search process. 
Semi-Structured Literature Review 
The semi-structured search is comprised of two 
parts: familiarizing with topics surrounding 
USOs, and a review of general literature on new 
venture valuation. For the former, the authors 
started off by reading literature handed out by 
entrepreneurial scholars at NTNU, 
namely literature reviews (Mustar et al., 2006; 
Rothaermel et al., 2007; Djokovic and Souitaris, 
2008; O’Shea et al., 2008; Rasmussen et al., 
2013; Wright, 2014), article (Widding et al., 
2009), and the book (Shane, 2004). For the latter, 
the authors initially attempted to identify 
literature on valuation of USOs through a 
structured search, however the search yielded 
very limited results. Consequently, the focus was 
shifted to valuation in general, and a semi-
structured search was chosen due to the vast and 
dispersed amount of literature available on the 
subject. As a starting point, Fernandez (2002), 
recommended by scholars at NTNU, was read. 
This book was used to identify relevant search 
terms, which are listed in table 1. A starting pool 
of articles were identified by searching on these 
terms in the ISI Web of Science-database. To 
limit the scope of the search, only valuation 
literature that fulfilled one of the following two 
criteria was included in the pool of articles: 1) 
the literature addressed the three most common 
valuation methods used on new ventures, as 
identified by Fernandez (2002), or 2) the 
literature addressed new venture valuation. 
Thereafter snowballing was used (mainly 
backwards snowballing). 
Figure 2. Theoretical framework 
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Table 1. The search phrases used were a combination of 
the terms listed in the table  and the term “valuation*”. 
Structured Literature Review 
Our structured review comprised of six steps: 
Step 1 - Search. The first step of the review 
comprised of a search in the ISI Web of Science-
database. The ISI database covers the leading 
journals from a broad range of publishers, so the 
chances of leaving out any important journals 
were negligible. As previously highlighted, there 
are many names and terms used to describe the 
phenomenon of university spinoffs, and the 
initial semi-structured review was used to 
identify commonly used terms from among 
others, Mustar et al. (2006), Rothaermel et al. 
(2007), Djokovic and Souitaris (2008), O’Shea et 
al. (2008), Rasmussen et al. (2013) and Wright 
(2014). The different terms are listed in table 2. 
 
Table 2. USO search terms 
The 60 different combinations of the terms in 
table 2 were combined to create a search phrase1. 
The search was limited to title, abstract and 
keywords, and returned 522 results. It would 
have been possible to further limit the search 
phrase by including terms describing the scope 
of this thesis, i.e. “resources” or 
“characteristics”, but to ensure that no articles 
were missed due to the use of the “wrong” word, 
the authors chose to manually process the 
articles with regards to scope. A set of discard 
criteria was defined to ease the job of deciding 
what articles to include in the literature review. 
These criteria were as follows, and were used 
throughout the article selection process: 
1. Wrong unit of analysis   
Many of the retrieved articles focused on 
a different level of analysis, for example 
on the university itself, on government 
policies or on TTOs. These articles were 
discarded. 
2. Focus on aspects outside the scope of 
this thesis 
A lot of the retrieved articles did not focus 
on the primary topic in this study, i.e. 
resources and resource characteristics. 
Examples of frequent topics were how 
universities affect the creation of startups 
and intellectual property rights in spinoffs. 
These were discarded.   
3. Not adhering to this study's 
definition of USOs  
Articles that focused on firms that did not 
qualify under the definition of USOs 
employed in this study were 
discarded.  This included articles that 
covered other types of spinoffs, such as 
those with corporations as the originating 
institution. 
Step 2 - Title screening. The first screening of 
the retrieved articles was based solely on reading 
their title, and both authors reviewed the search 
results to reduce subjective bias. Each author 
read the 522 titles and tagged articles believed to 
fulfill the above criteria. To merge the authors 
individual lists the union of the two was taken. 
This review left 190 articles. 
Step 3 - Abstract screening. The next stage 
included a screening of the articles based on their 
abstract. All abstracts were thoroughly reviewed, 
and irrelevant articles in accordance with the 
above screening criteria were discarded. After 
                                                        
1 Appendix 1 
Terms
Start%up
Firm
Theory
Methods
Venture5capitalist
Entrepreneurial
Origin Nature+of+Firm
Academic New*venture*
Faculty Spin6off*
Research6based Spin6out*
Science6based Spinoff*
R&D*Management Spinout*
Scientist New*firm*
University Entrepreneurial
Entrepreneurship
Start*up*
Spinning*out
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this, a total of 83 articles remained as relevant 
for this study. 
Step 4 - Article retrieval. All the 83 identified 
articles were attempted collected, however, 23 
articles turned out to be difficult to retrieve 
despite their listing in the search results from the 
ISI database. Both authors conducted rigorous 
Google searches for the articles, and 7 of the 
missing articles were found. The remaining 16 
that were not found were primarily conference 
proceedings. This left a total of 67 articles for 
further assessment. 
Step 5 - In-depth screening. All the 67 articles 
were subsequently given a quick read-through to 
determine if they were relevant for this study. 
The introductions, research questions and 
conclusions were given particular focus. With a 
basis in the three previously defined selection 
criteria, 26 articles were found to be relevant. 
Step 6 - Read-through. All the articles in the 
“relevant” category were read thoroughly. 
Backward snowballing was used to further 
identify literature not uncovered by the literature 
search. This stage involved reading the literature 
list in the articles already identified as relevant. 
If a relevant citation was not included in the 
literature search, the article was added to the list 
of articles to read. The pool of literature on 
university spinoffs is limited in size, so 
snowballing one or two steps was often enough 
to return to already known literature. When all 
articles had been read, and all relevant citations 
were traced, the literature review ended up 
containing 44 articles. 
 
Figure 3. Literature search stages 
Descriptives 
The search revealed a total of 44 articles 
published between 1986 and 2014, and scattered 
across a total of 20 journals as shown in table 3, 
where Research Policy has the highest number of 
published articles, a total of 10. This observation 
corresponds to the journal distribution found by 
Rothaermel et al. (2007), and gives this sample 
validity. Table 3 also includes each journals 
Impact Factor from 2013, which is an 
unweighted factor that reflects the average 
number of citations of the most recent articles in 
the journals (Garfield, 2006), and is mostly used 
to show the relative importance of a journal 
within a field of research. Research Policy has a 
very high impact factor for a multi-disciplinary 
social science journal2, which further strengthens 
the validity of our results. 
 
Table 3. Journal overview 
Methodological Limitations 
There are several limitations to the methodology 
used in this study. As for the unstructured search, 
it is possible that relevant articles on the topic of 
valuation have been missed, which might have 
been identified if a structured search was 
employed. As for the structured search, only the 
                                                        
2 http://www.journals.elsevier.com/research-policy 
Journals:*20 #*of*
articles
Impact*
Factor
Research(Policy 10 3,73
The(Journal(of(Technology(Transfer 5 1,67
Technovation 5 4,08
Journal(of(Business(Venturing 3 5,17
R&D(Management 2 1,86
Technology(Analysis(&(Strategic(Management 2 1,05
Entrepreneurship(Theory(and(Practice 2 3,92
Industrial(and(Corporate(Change 2 1,64
Technological(Forecasting(and(Social(Change 1 2,68
Journal(of(technology(management(&(
innovation 1 0,61
Economic(Development(Quarterly 1 0,81
Strategic(Entrepreneurship(Journal 1 2,48
Journal(of(Management(Studies 1 4,35
Management(science 1 3,1
Economic(Inquiry 1 1,2
Science(and(Public(Policy 1 1,23
Tijdschrift(voor(economische(en(sociale(
geografie 1 1,27
The(business(of(biotechnology:(from(the(bench(
to(the(street
1 N/A
IEEE(Transactions(on(Engineering(Management 1 1,36
Venture(Capital 1 0,53
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ISI Web of Science database was used in our 
initial search. This excludes potential relevant 
articles in journals not covered by the ISI 
database, however the probability of this is low 
as the database covers the majority of the leading 
journals. Further on, backwards snowballing can 
lead to the identification of articles in journals 
not covered in the primary database used. A 
second limitation to the structured search is the 
limited set of keywords used to conduct the 
initial search. It is possible that certain relevant 
terms might have been excluded, and 
followingly relevant articles left unidentified. A 
third limitation relates to the method employed 
to screen the initial 522 articles. The first 
screening was based solely on titles, and even 
though subjective bias was attempted reduced by 
both authors reading all titles, it is possible that 
false negatives can have occurred, i.e. relevant 
articles eliminated. A fourth limitation is that 
after the initial assessment of the titles, only one 
of the authors reviewed the abstracts for further 
elimination of articles. This bias could have been 
avoided if both authors reviewed the abstracts, 
however, resource limitations prohibited this. A 
fifth limitation is that we narrowed our focus to 
literature exclusively focusing on USOs. By 
excluding other research-based startups, which 
have many similarities to USOs and are likely to 
face many of the same valuation problems, we 
might have overlooked relevant literature. 
Literature Review 
In this section, we present the main findings 
from the literature reviews on both valuation and 
university spinoffs. First, a review of literature 
on common valuation methods used by venture 
capitalists as well as literature on new venture 
valuation is introduced. Thereafter we present 
literature on USO resources and resource 
characteristics. 
Company Valuation 
According to principles in corporate finance, the 
return an investor should seek on an investment 
is a function of the investments non-diversifiable 
risk, measured through the investments Beta 
(Brealey, 2012). The Beta is a measure of the 
investments correlation to the market, which 
represents the only risk an investor cannot 
eliminate through diversifying her portfolio. 
Followingly, an investor should not require 
higher returns for holding investments that have 
unique or diversifiable risk, because it can be 
eliminated. Only market risk, which is non-
diversifiable, should warrant higher required 
returns. This is operationalized in the CAPM -
model (capital asset pricing model), which 
establishes that the required return on an 
investment should be positively correlated to the 
long term risk-free interest rate, and to the stock 
market premium (Wright Robbie, 1998): !" = !$ + &"(!( − !$)+
where !$ = ,ℎ.+!/01+2!..+!34.+&" = ,ℎ.+5.43+62+4ℎ.+0.78!/49+!( = :;<.74.=+>3!1.4+!.48!?+
 
In the context of valuation, the CAPM is 
commonly used by investors to calculate their 
required return, and when valuing a company, it 
is applied as the discount rate to estimate its 
present value. Numerous studies have however 
highlighted that traditional risk/return models 
such as the CAPM are difficult to apply when 
valuing new ventures (Damodaran, 2009; Seppä 
and Laamanen, 2001; Ge et al., 2005; 
Landström, 2007; Timmons and Spinelli, 2004). 
Whilst mature firms generally can exhibit several 
years of objective operating data, a new venture 
cannot, which results in high uncertainty and 
informational asymmetries (Sanders and Boivie, 
2004), and consequently increased expected 
errors in forecasts (Wright Robbie, 1998). 
Compared to established firms, new ventures are 
subject to several, qualitatively different sources 
of risk and uncertainty (Berk et al., 2004), and 
particularly new technology based firms have 
overall higher risks than other ventures (Brophy 
and Haessler, 1994). Whilst mature companies 
mainly face risks associated with product 
demand and production costs, new ventures also 
face “technical” uncertainty regarding the 
success of the venture itself and the time and 
cost required to bring the innovation to market, 
as well as exogenous risks associated with the 
actions of competitors and possible changes in 
the market environment prior to launch (Berk et 
al., 2004). Despite these difficulties, early stage 
company valuation remains an under researched 
question, and studies that provide operational 
guidance on valuing new ventures are lacking 
(Ge et al., 2005).  In fact, no relevant articles 
aimed specifically at the valuation of early-stage 
high-tech firms or USOs were identified in our 
literature review. Admittedly, increasing 
attention within entrepreneurship literature has 
been paid to venture capital investments, but this 
has been on the criteria to screen a deal, i.e. the 
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criteria to invest or not, and not on the valuation 
process itself or how the criteria relate to firm 
value (Hudson, 2005; Ge et al., 2005). 
Due to the lacking literature on valuation of early 
stage high-tech firms and USOs, we focus our 
attention on common valuation methods used by 
investors on early stage ventures in general. 
Further on we present associated weaknesses in 
the context of new venture valuation highlighted 
in the reviewed literature.  The lack of literature 
on valuation of USOs confirms the lack of 
research attention this topic has received, and 
underpins the importance of this paper as the 
first of its kind. 
Valuation Methods 
Fernandez (2002), in his book Company 
Valuation Methods and Shareholder Value 
Creation, states that methods for valuing 
companies can be classified into six groups as 
listed in table 4.  
Because the focus of this study is on early stage 
USOs, only the methods that are most commonly 
used by investors on early stage ventures are 
presented, namely cash flow discounting, 
balance sheet and income statement (Seppä and 
Laamanen, 2001). For each group of methods, 
the authors give a brief introduction to the logic 
underlying it, specific valuation techniques 
within each group, as well as limitations 
emphasized by previous researchers on their 
applicability to early stage ventures. 
Cash Flow Discounting Valuation Methods 
A well accepted axiom in mainstream finance is 
that that the economic value of an investment is 
the present value of all the future cash flows 
generated by it (Brealey, 2012). Discounted cash 
flow methods rely on this axiom to define the 
value of a company as the sum of the uncertain 
future cash flows from the company discounted 
at a risk adjusted rate (Petitt and Ferris, 2013). 
“There appears to be wide 
agreement that, conceptually, the 
soundest measures of an assets 
value is the discounted value of the 
future cash flow that it will 
generate “ 
– Lemke (1966) 
Cash flow discounting methods are based on 
detailed forecasts of the company’s assets that 
are related to the generation of cash flows, for 
example interest payments, payroll, taxes, 
revenues, materials etc. (Fernández, 2007). 
According to Damodaran (2009), there are four 
key pieces that make up any valuation based on a 
discounted cash flow: existing assets and the 
future cash flow generated by them; the expected 
growth rate of both existing assets and new 
investments; the risk adjusted discount rate for 
each of the cash flow streams; and an assessment 
of when the firm will become a stable growth 
firm which is used to estimate the terminal value, 
i.e. the value of all future cash flows after stable 
growth is reached. The general cash flow 
discounting method to estimate the present value 
of a firm can be summarized by the following 
equation, where the last term represents the 
terminal value: @3A8.B = CDE1 + ! E + CDG! − H ∗ 1 + ! G+
where CD/ = C30ℎ+2A6J+/?+9.3!+/ ! = !.K8/!.=+!.48!?+CD? = ,ℎ.+9.3!A9+730ℎ+2A6J+.;<.74.= ++++++++++++++324.!+9.3!+?, J/4ℎ+3+H!6J4ℎ+!34.+H 
Estimating future cash flows can either be done 
by a top-down approach, where one drills down 
Balance'Sheet Income'Statement Mixed'(Goodwill) Cash'Flow'Discounting Value'Creation Options
Book$value Multiples Classic Free$cash$flow EVA Black$and$Scholes
Adjusted$book$value PER
Union$of$European$
Accounting$Experts
Equity$cash$flow Economic$profit Investment$option
Sales Dividens Cash$value$added Expand$the$project
Liquidation$value P/EBITDA Abbreviated$income Capital$cash$flow
Delay$the$
investment
Substantial$value Other$multiples Others APV CFROI Alternative$uses
Table 4. Valuation methods 
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from the total market for the company's service 
or product to estimate its expected revenues and 
earnings, or the bottom-up approach, where one 
starts out considering the company's production 
capacity. Discount rates are for mature public 
firms often calculated using risk/return models 
such as the CAPM. In the case of new ventures, 
venture capitalists often apply predetermined 
discount rates, usually between 40% and 60% 
(Sahlman, 1990). The high discount rates are 
justified by investors on the basis that they 
include the risk free interest rate, the ventures 
non-diversifiable risk, a market risk premium, an 
illiquidity discount, and finally compensation for 
the value added by the investor (Sahlman, 1990). 
Further on, venture capitalists often use a 
modified version of the traditional cash flow 
discounting method known as the venture capital 
method. Instead of taking the firms perspective, 
the venture capital method takes the perspective 
of the investor (Hellman, 2001). There are four 
basic steps involved; forecast sales or earnings 
for a period of years, estimate the time at which 
the investor will exit, value the company at the 
time of exit based on an assumed multiple, and 
finally apply an appropriate discount rate. 
Hellman (2001) points out that it is the simplicity 
of the venture capital method that makes it 
advantageous. 
In the context of valuing new ventures, Keeley et 
al. (1996) point out that high levels of risk, 
which makes it difficult to estimate an 
appropriate discount rate and to forecast cash 
flows, as well as multiple investment stages, 
which provides the investor options to abandon 
the investment before making all planned 
payments, makes it difficult to use the 
discounted cash flow methods. Damodaran 
(2009) highlights that the absence of historical 
data makes it difficult to estimate future 
revenues, assess how revenues from existing 
assets will change under different 
macroeconomic conditions as well as estimate 
the expected return on invested capital. 
Fernández (2007) emphasizes that determining 
the discount rate is one of the most important 
tasks in cash flow discounting methods, yet 
Damodaran (2009) writes that there is no way to 
estimate an equity beta, or use the market 
interest rate on debt, rendering traditional risk 
return models used to find discount rates useless. 
As for the venture capital method, Harper and 
Rose (1993) characterize it as a “rule of 
thumb”, Gompers and Lerner (2001) write that 
the method is highly subjective and difficult to 
justify, and Hellman (2001) concludes that it 
makes many strong assumptions that limit its 
usefulness. 
Balance Sheet Methods 
Valuation methods based on balance sheets 
consider that the value of a company lies in its 
assets, and therefore seek to value a company by 
estimating asset values (Fernandez, 2002). The 
most common balance sheet approach is the 
book value (or net asset) method, where the 
company’s total liabilities are subtracted from its 
total assets to arrive at the company’s value. The 
adjusted book value method adjusts the values of 
the company’s assets and liabilities according to 
their current market value. Company value 
according to the liquidation method is the 
difference between value obtained from selling 
the company’s assets and paying off its debt, 
whilst the substantial value method seeks to 
identify the investment that must be made to 
form a company having identical conditions and 
assets as the company being valued.  
In contrast to more mature ventures who often 
have substantial physical assets, intellectual 
assets such as patents may constitute a 
significant part of the balance sheet of new 
technology based firm, and a number of studies 
have looked at the valuation of these. Parr and 
Smith (2005) outline three quantitative methods 
for valuing patents: the cost approach, the market 
approach and the income approach. The cost 
approach is based on the replacement cost of the 
patented invention, the market approach uses 
comparable patent transactions as a basis to 
obtain value, and lastly the income approach 
values a patent based on the estimated future 
income arising from it over its entire life (Parr 
and Smith, 2005). 
Ge et al. (2005) write that the problem with 
balance sheet methods, when valuing early stage 
companies, is that they ignore the value of 
growth opportunities. Additionally, most new 
ventures have limited tangible assets, and 
valuing intangible assets, such as patents for 
which there has not yet been identified a market 
application, are according to Clarysse and 
Bruneel (2007) the most difficult issue in 
valuation. Fernandez (2002) adds that balance 
sheet methods do not include factors such as 
organizational issues or the current situation in 
the industry. 
Income Statement Valuation Methods 
These are methods that seek to value a company 
based on sales, earnings or other indicators stated 
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on its income statement (Fernandez, 2002). 
Some of the most common methods used are 
those that rely on different kinds of multiples, for 
example price/sales, where a company is valued 
based on its sales. Other common multiples are 
value of the company over EBIT, EBITDA, 
operating cash flow or book value. Methods such 
as these are also called relative valuation 
methods because the value is derived from what 
the market is paying for similar firms 
(Damodaran, 2009), and the fundamental 
argument underlying relative valuation is that 
similar assets should be priced equally (Liu et 
al., 2002). To use the multiples approach, three 
parameters are required: a scaling factor, a 
comparable multiple, and a discount rate. The 
scaling factor used varies greatly, and can be 
sales, earnings, EBITDA or any other financial 
measure of the company being valued. The 
comparable multiples can either be based on 
private or public transaction prices. Private 
multiples are preferred by many valuation 
analysts when valuing young ventures because 
they claim that they are more representable in 
terms of illiquidity and risk. Illiquidity is a 
central issue in new ventures due to few 
buyers/sellers and therefore substantial 
transaction costs (Koeplin et al., 2000), and 
should followingly be reflected in the new 
ventures value. If a public multiple is used, the 
analyst can choose an average multiple for the 
entire industry in question, or a multiple based 
on a single company. Finally, a discount rate 
may be necessary, if the scaling factor used is 
based on income statement forecasts.  For new 
ventures, it is often common to forecast an 
income statement that is representative of the 
new ventures steady-state performance, i.e. when 
it has stable sales and earnings, and use a scaling 
factor from this forecast. To calculate the present 
value of the company it then becomes necessary 
to discount the estimated value. If a public 
multiple is used it is also common to add an 
illiquidity discount rate. 
Damodaran (2009) writes that multiples are best 
suited when valuing firms in businesses with 
many other firms as well as where transactions 
are common. Following, they are difficult to 
apply to firms in unique businesses, and he 
highlights five potential problems with using 
multiples to value young businesses: first, 
comparative multiples stem from arms length 
transactions where side factors specific to the 
transaction are hidden. Second, because private 
transactions are infrequent, timing differences 
occur. Third, to compare different companies, a 
scaling variable is used, such as sales, earnings 
or book value. Young companies tend not to 
have scaling variables that are representative for 
how the company will perform when fully 
operational. Fourth, equity claims vary across 
companies and affect the economic value of each 
claim, and fifth, it is uncertain if geographical 
differences render these methods erroneous. Ge 
et al. (2005) finds three problems with using the 
multiples approach on startups: lack of earnings, 
difficulty in defining the boundaries for whom 
comparable companies are, and lastly, even with 
a reference group defined, it is still quite 
subjective which multiple one should choose. 
“A biased analyst who is allowed to 
choose the multiple on which the 
valuation is based and to pick the 
comparable firms can essentially 
ensure that almost any value can be 
justified.” 
– Damodaran (2001) 
Summary of New Venture Valuation 
Based on the above literature it is evident that 
new venture valuation is a difficult task, and that 
the valuation methods most commonly used are 
in many cases inadequate for new ventures (Ge 
et al., 2005; Fernandez, 2002; Damodaran, 
2009). Yet, in most cases these methods are 
readily applied, and in practice, many venture 
capitalists simply use very high discount rates to 
hedge against the uncertainty and inaccuracies of 
using these methods (Sahlman, 1990). This 
however leads to fewer new ventures receiving 
funding, because venture capitalists hesitate to 
fund any new venture that cannot, within 
reasonable doubt, be expected to at least be 
valued between $25 to $50 million in five years 
(MacMillan et al., 1986). When new venture 
valuation is already known to be problematic, to 
answer the research question in this study, 
namely the applicability of these methods on 
early-stage USOs, it then becomes the 
researcher's task to investigate how USOs differ 
from other new ventures, and how these 
differences affect the applicability of traditional 
valuation methods compared to other new 
ventures. To identify these differences, the 
authors review in the following chapter literature 
on characteristics of initial resource endowments 
of USOs, who together with the review of 
literature on new venture valuation constitute the 
theoretical foundation for answering our research 
question.  
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Resource Characteristics of Early Stage 
University Spinoffs 
Mustar et al. (2006) state that four categories of 
resources are especially important for research-
based spinoffs, namely human, technological, 
social and financial. In the context of early-stage 
valuation, the authors argue that technological 
resources are the main source of differences 
between a USO and other new ventures. This is 
based on the fact that the literature review 
revealed a majority of articles pertaining to the 
technological resources of a USO, and none or 
few highlighting significant differences between 
the other three resource categories compared to 
other new ventures. Also, as Agarwal and Shah 
(2014) point out, technology is the core of all 
academic founded firms, and Shane (2004) that 
these companies are often founded on years of 
research with nothing more than proof of 
concepts. The following review is therefore 
heavily skewed towards a review of 
characteristics of initial technological resource 
endowments in USOs. It is worth mentioning 
that among the few findings on the other 
resource categories were Ensley and Hmieleski 
(2005), who for human resources found that top 
management teams (TMT) of USOs are more 
homogenous in terms of education, industry 
experience, functional expertise and skills than 
those of independent startups. Additionally, USO 
founders tend to possess deeper technological 
experience (Colombo and Piva, 2012), but little 
industry knowledge (Granovetter, 1973) and a 
lower degree of entrepreneurial and managerial 
experience compared to those of nonacademic 
new technology-based firms (Iacobucci et al., 
2011; Colombo and Piva, 2012; Criaco et al., 
2013; Vohora et al., 2004; Agarwal and Shah, 
2014). For social resources it was found that the 
organizational environment of USOs 
differentiate them from other independent 
startups, where the parent university and the 
associated institutes provide networks that are 
else hard to acquire. Through the parent 
university, the spinoff can gain access to 
laboratories and equipment as well as human 
resources employed at the institution (Shane, 
2004). For financial resources it was found that 
USOs face challenges in acquiring early stage 
capital due to the uncertainty associated with 
these companies (Widding et al., 2009; Wright et 
al., 2006; Shane, 2004) 
Technological Resources 
Academic entrepreneurship is heavily based on 
technological advances in laboratory research, 
and technical knowledge is the core of all 
founded firms (Agarwal and Shah, 2014). Six 
characteristics of initial technological resource 
endowments are highlighted in the reviewed 
literature; USOs tend to be founded on early 
stage technologies that are radical and provide 
significant technical advances, have general-
purpose applications, that provide significant 
benefits to the customer, and finally that have 
strong intellectual property protection (Doutriaux 
and Barker, 1995; Nelsen, 1991; del Campo et 
al., 1999; Shane, 2004). Followingly each 
characteristic is reviewed. 
Early Stage Technologies 
Licensing out unproven, early stage technology 
is difficult, and Doutriaux and Barker (1995) and 
Shane (2004) write that early stage inventions 
therefore tend to result in the creation of 
spinoffs. Further, these early stage technologies 
have a number of implications on the new 
venture. Studies show that the risk of loss 
associated with investments from venture 
capitalists steadily decrease as the venture 
evolves into later development stages (Seppä and 
Laamanen, 2001), which naturally leads to 
increased perceived risks associated with early 
stage technologies. Wright et al. (2006), citing 
Murray and Lott (1995) and Lockett et al. 
(2005), write that venture capitalists, especially 
in Europe, are reluctant to invest in early stage 
high-tech companies, and that informational 
asymmetries in companies working with 
unproven technologies may be significant. 
Further, due to high levels of uncertainty 
regarding the technologies potential and the 
marketability of its functionality, common risk 
assessment measures are difficult to apply. 
“Many university inventions lead to 
the formation of spinoffs because 
they are early stage technologies 
that are little more than ‘proofs of 
concept’ when the researcher 
discloses the invention to the 
university technology licensing 
office” 
– Shane (2004) 
Radical Technologies That Provide Significant 
Technical Advances 
There are many definitions for what constitutes 
radical innovation, and although the literature 
has yet to converge to a universally accepted 
definition, common to many of them is that the 
innovation incorporates technology that there is 
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little previous knowledge about and that is a 
clear and risky departure from existing practice 
(Green et al., 1995; Ettlie et al., 1984). Radical 
technologies are often recognized as engines of 
growth, productivity and performance 
(Schumpeter, 1928; Linton and Walsh, 2008; 
Maine, 2008), and more often than not, 
university spinoffs are founded to exploit 
technologies that are radical. Shane (2004) finds 
that for university spinoffs, it is important that 
the underlying technology on which the 
company is founded represents transitions in the 
marketplace, or makes way for new product or 
services, and Utterback (1996) states that 
established firms with a dominant market 
position rarely adopt radical innovations due to 
the fear that the new technology will cannibalize 
their existing products or services. To 
commercialize university technology spinoffs 
become necessary, which leads to the 
technologies underlying these companies being 
radical in nature. Further on, to offset the 
uncertainty associated with radical technologies, 
the technologies need to represent a significant 
technical advancement (del Campo et al., 1999) 
because they have greater economic value 
(Harhoff et al., 1999). Spinoffs commercializing 
radical technologies that do not provide 
significant technical advances cannot be justified 
from an economic standpoint (Shane, 2004). 
“Several academic studies show 
that radical technologies tend to 
provide the basis for the creation of 
university spinoffs, while 
incremental technologies are more 
likely to be licensed by established 
companies” 
– Shane (2004) 
General-Purpose Technologies 
USOs tend to exploit technologies with broad 
application areas and multiple fields of use 
(Nelsen, 1991; del Campo et al., 1999). This is 
primarily due to two reasons: first, applicability 
in multiple markets render more market 
opportunities; and second, established companies 
have trouble identifying what to use the 
technologies for (Shane, 2004). General-purpose 
technologies have important implications for the 
USO. Nelsen (1991) writes that general-purpose 
technologies are positively correlated with 
spinoff performance because they allow spinoffs 
to pursue multiple application areas, hence 
diversify risk, and multiple cash flow streams in 
different points in the ventures development. 
Shane (2004) writes that investors favor those 
spinoffs that possess general-purpose 
technologies. This is because general purpose 
technology makes the new venture more suited 
to adapt to changing circumstances, and 
subsequently provide a higher return to the 
investor. Clarysse et al. (2011) investigate how 
technological knowledge-sources in USOs affect 
performance, and find that broad technology 
scopes are positively associated with growth, and 
therefore performance. They go on to write that 
this might be due to the fact that broader 
technologies allow the companies to shift 
between market applications when faced with 
dead ends. Finally, Increased performance due to 
broader scope of the technology may be linked to 
increased possibilities for licensing out the 
technology, either if the spinoff is not able to 
leverage the technology themselves, or 
simultaneously in different markets 
(Gambardella and Giarratana, 2008). 
Significant Customer Value 
Because of the technology characteristics 
mentioned above, commercialization of 
university technology is a capital intensive task. 
This is further compounded by the inherent 
challenges of bringing university technology to 
the market, such as distance to the end user 
because of an upstream position in the value 
chain (Pavitt, 1984; Arora et al., 2001), and 
requirements to other players in the value chain 
to adapt entirely new technology (Abernathy and 
Clark, 1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
This implies that creating a spinoff company 
requires vast amount of financial resources, and 
university spinoffs cannot afford to exploit 
technologies that only offer small improvements 
in customer value that will not provide sufficient 
financial returns. Shane (2004) followingly 
writes that a characteristic of the initial 
technology endowments of USOs is that they 
provide significant customer value, because they 
are more likely to result in higher financial 
returns (Harhoff et al., 1999). In addition, 
technologies that provide significant technical 
advances offset the increased uncertainty and 
risk associated with radical and unproven early 
stage technologies. 
Strong Intellectual Property Protection 
Finally, strong intellectual property protection 
(IPR) is also a characteristic of the initial 
technology resource endowments of USOs. 
Nelsen (1991) states that strong intellectual 
property (IP) protection is important for the 
creation of USOs, as it is the only competitive 
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advantage the firm has at inception, and Shane 
(2004) and De Coster and Butler (2005) support 
this by writing that spinoffs are generally more 
likely to be founded when the underlying 
invention is protected by large portfolios of 
broad-scoped patents. Patent portfolios are 
valuable as they assert the spinoff greater control 
over the technology, and patents with broad 
scopes allow for easier blocking of competitors. 
Summary of Literature Review 
Based on the above literature reviews on venture 
valuation and USOs, it is evident that several 
studies have separately focused on valuing early 
stage ventures, and the unique characteristics of 
initial resource endowments in USOs. More 
specifically it has been seen that valuing these 
ventures is problematic and that these firms 
differ especially in their technological resource 
endowments compared to other new ventures. 
However, no previous research, to our 
knowledge, have linked the two together and 
examined how the unique technological resource 
characteristics affect the process of valuing these 
firms. Different types of new ventures naturally 
are faced with different types of challenges in the 
valuation process due to unique firm 
characteristics, and ignoring these differences 
and assuming that the same methods can be 
applied to all companies may lead to significant 
erroneous valuations. In the following the 
authors seek to fill this literature gap. 
Discussion 
In light of the literature gap identified above, in 
this section we discuss how the characteristics of 
initial resource endowments affect the 
applicability of traditional valuation methods 
with a basis in the presented theoretical 
framework. Because the underlying problem in 
valuing a new venture is uncertainty, we 
leverage the previously presented theory on risk 
and uncertainty (Knight, 1921) to first, argue 
how specific resource characteristics affect the 
uncertainty associated with a USO, and second, 
how that affects the applicability of traditional 
valuation methods. 
University Spinoffs and Uncertainty 
The literature review revealed that particularly 
characteristics of the technical resources in these 
companies are unique compared to other new 
ventures. When assessing whether valuation of 
early-stage USOs is indeed a more difficult task 
than valuing any other startup, it is necessary to 
focus our efforts on exactly these characteristics 
that set these companies apart, and we will 
therefore primarily focus our discussion on 
technical resources. To further justify our focus 
on technical resources we briefly comment on 
how the other three resource categories affect 
uncertainty in a USO compared to other new 
ventures in the context of valuation. 
In the reviewed literature, founding team 
homogeneity in terms of backgrounds and 
experiences, was identified as a characteristic of 
human capital resources in USOs that differ from 
other new ventures. There is obviously, 
remembering the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921), uncertainty 
connected to this fact, such as whether the 
founding team has enough experience and 
knowledge within all the necessary disciplines to 
successfully launch the new venture. This is 
categorized as uncertainty, not risk, because 
there is no possible way to estimate the 
probability of the founding team having the 
necessary combination of skills and experiences. 
However, this uncertainty can be significantly 
reduced by investors through funding terms, 
such as staging investments, hiring external 
managers, or actively participating in the 
management team themselves, and so do not in 
any significant way affect the applicability of 
traditional valuation methods on these firms. 
The authors argue that social resources primarily 
assist in reducing uncertainty, and do not directly 
affect the applicability of existing valuation 
methods on early-stage USOs compared to other 
new ventures. A social resource such as a 
relationship between the USO and an investor 
can significantly reduce informational 
asymmetries between the two, effectively 
reducing uncertainty, and making it easier for the 
investor to value the company. However, the 
lack of such a relationship does not increase 
uncertainty for an investor, as the outset is that 
no relationship exists. As such, there is no 
significant difference between the social 
resources in a USO and those in an independent 
startup that increase uncertainty in the context of 
valuation. 
Finally, financial resources, or more precisely 
the lack thereof, can affect the valuation of a 
firm, but do not in any significant way contribute 
to increased uncertainty compared to other new 
ventures. In the case of USOs it is likely that 
several rounds of financing will be needed 
before the new venture can survive by itself. The 
possible dilution effects of future financing 
rounds affect the valuations investors put on 
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companies, however, these effects can be 
mitigated through contractual agreements 
(Sahlman, 1990), and should therefore not affect 
the applicability of traditional valuation methods 
on these firms. 
Technological Resources 
Six characteristics of USOs initial technological 
resource endowments have been highlighted in 
the literature review, namely that the technology 
is often early-stage, radical and provides 
significant technical advances, has general 
purpose applications, provides significant 
customer benefits, and has strong intellectual 
property protection. In the following, we discuss 
how each of these characteristics affect the 
uncertainty in a USO from a valuation 
standpoint. 
Early Stage Technologies 
USOs are often founded on research, and the 
underlying technologies are rarely more than 
proof of concepts (Doutriaux and Barker, 1995). 
It has been shown in the reviewed literature that 
early stage technologies are likely to have a 
negative impact on performance due to higher 
uncertainty and lower probability of receiving 
funding, where the latter is previously shown to 
be the single most important determinant for 
achieving IPO (Hayter, 2013; Clarysse et al., 
2011). The early stages of the technologies have 
three important implications on the uncertainty 
in USOs; it leads to uncertainty about the 
commercial applicability of the research, 
uncertainty regarding the development time 
frame, and uncertainty about the financial needs 
of the company. First, because the underlying 
factor for developing the technology in question 
has been research at the university where the 
USO originated, investors are faced with 
uncertainty as to whether the technology is 
applicable in a commercial product. Trying to 
estimate the probability of achieving this is an 
impossible task, and can therefore be categorized 
as fundamental uncertainty. Second, turning the 
research into a commercial product is a time 
consuming task, and research indicates that it 
takes an average of 10 years to commercialize 
technology in a USO (Rasmussen et al., 2013; 
Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006). Significant 
changes in the market environment and customer 
needs can occur in such a timeframe, which 
increases the uncertainty as to whether the 
investor will ever see a return on his investment. 
Again, estimating the probabilities of such 
events occurring, either a priori or through 
statistical analysis, is an impossible task, leading 
to increased fundamental uncertainty. Finally, 
because of the two aforementioned reasons, the 
investor is faced with uncertainty in regards to 
the financial needs of the company. The longer 
the development time frame, the larger the error 
variance in the estimated financial needs is likely 
to be. Big changes in financial needs after an 
initial investment can pressure the investor into a 
situation where they must keep investing to keep 
their option on a future return, or they must face 
dilution. The probability of this happening is 
likely to be smaller in companies that have 
shorter development timeframes, and 
followingly the early stages of the technology 
lead to USOs having higher uncertainty. 
Radical Technologies That Provide Significant 
Technical Advances 
Technologies that are radical and provide 
significant technical advances are by definition 
more risky to work with than mature 
technologies because they are previously 
untested and require new knowledge. USOs, who 
more often than not work with technologies that 
exhibit these characteristics, are venturing into 
uncertain areas where knowledge is undeveloped 
or lacking, and the undertaking is costly (Green 
et al., 1995). Further on, research has shown that 
projects developing radical innovations are less 
likely to be clearly tied to a market need, and 
more likely to fail (Baker et al., 1985; Souder, 
1987). Distinguishing between risk and 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921), radical projects that 
provide significant technical advances clearly 
increase the uncertainty in a USO. It becomes 
meaningless to try to estimate the probabilities of 
a USO succeeding in developing the technology 
to commercial application, or the probability of 
finding a target market either a priori or through 
empirical evaluation because the instances in 
question are highly unique. The uncertainty in 
the USOs is further compounded by the fact that 
these technologies represent new advanced 
knowledge areas, which investors have difficulty 
understanding (Shane, 2004). This increases the 
informational asymmetries between the investor 
and the entrepreneur, making it even harder for 
the investor to assess the true potential of the 
project, and to assess the added value the 
investor can deliver through other resources than 
capital, such as advice and guidance. The added 
uncertainty in USOs due to the technologies 
these companies are founded on often being 
radical and leading to significant advances, is 
likely to decline as the venture matures to later 
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stages of the development because more 
knowledge and information is accumulated, 
however, in the early stages, the uncertainty seen 
from a valuation standpoint will, as we will 
discuss later, significantly impact investors 
ability to assess the project's value. 
General-Purpose Technologies 
General-purpose technologies are in previous 
research highlighted as being associated with 
venture growth (Grant, 1996). The authors 
further argue that general purpose technologies 
in fact reduce uncertainty seen from the 
viewpoint of an investor. USOs often work with 
early-stage and radical technologies that do not 
have any target markets yet, and where there is 
uncertainty about ever finding an applicable 
market. This uncertainty is however reduced 
when the technology has broad application areas 
and can be utilized in many different markets 
and industries. This is substantiated by Nelsen 
(1991), who points out that general-purpose 
technologies are positively correlated with 
spinoff performance because they allow spinoffs 
to diversify risk and earn multiple cash flows at 
different points in time during the ventures 
development. For example, general-purpose 
technologies permit the USO to license out the 
technology to certain application areas whilst 
keeping control over other application areas, 
which from an investor's viewpoint reduces the 
uncertainty about ever earning a return due to 
several parallel development efforts. 
Significant Customer Value 
As for technologies that provide significant 
customer benefits, no explanation is needed to 
conclude that they reduce the uncertainty an 
investor is faced with when assessing a USO. 
Technologies that are more worth to customers 
are more likely to earn higher returns, and they 
are not faced with the same “market push” 
problems that new technologies without a 
specific demand face. It is therefore evident that 
technologies that provide significant customer 
benefits reduce the uncertainty associated with a 
USO. 
Strong Intellectual Property Protection 
Strong intellectual property protection is yet 
another technical resource characteristic that, 
seen from the viewpoint of an investor, should 
reduce uncertainty. Previous research on 
patenting has shown that there is a positive 
correlation between patents and firm 
performance (Deeds et al., 2000; Zahra and 
Bogner, 2000; Powers and McDougall, 2005). 
From an investor’s viewpoint then, because they 
are more likely to earn higher returns when the 
USO has stronger intellectual property 
protection, this characteristic reduces the 
uncertainty in a USO. Further on, strong 
intellectual property protection should offset 
some of the uncertainty associated with long 
development times. By having strong IPR the 
USO can protect its technical space from 
competitors, and reduce the chances of other 
companies beating them in commercializing the 
same technology. Finally, if the USO is 
unsuccessful in commercializing the technology, 
they will still assert control over it through the 
IPR, which can be sold off to other companies 
who might see value in owning the technology 
for future use. 
In the above discussion the authors have 
presented how characteristics of initial technical 
resource endowments in USOs affect the 
uncertainty in these companies seen from the 
viewpoint of an investor. The authors have 
argued that three of these characteristics, radical, 
significant technical advances and early stage, in 
accordance with Knight's (1921) distinction 
between risk and uncertainty, lead to high 
fundamental uncertainty, whilst on the other 
hand, general purpose technologies that provide 
significant customer benefits and have strong 
intellectual property protection in fact reduce it. 
In the following we discuss how this uncertainty 
affects the applicability of traditional valuation 
methods. 
University Spinoffs and Traditional 
Valuation Methods 
The problems with using existing valuation 
methods on startups in general have already been 
highlighted in entrepreneurship and valuation 
literature (Ge et al., 2005; Fernandez, 2002; 
Damodaran, 2009). Despite this, these methods 
are still commonly used amongst investors due 
to the lack of better ways. Naturally, an estimate 
is better than a guess. However, in the case of 
early stage USOs, using existing valuation 
methods pose a new set of challenges due to the 
high uncertainty in these firms. Uncertainty is 
commonly factored into valuations by venture 
capitalists through high discount rates, 
commonly between 40% and 60% (Sahlman, 
1990). Using the same underlying logic, and 
considering that a USO is highly more uncertain 
than the general startup, discount rates as high as 
70%, 80% or 90% could be argued by an 
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investor. This however is in practice unfeasible, 
and would result in almost all early-stage USOs 
being categorized as unprofitable ventures. A 
simple example can explain why. Assuming that 
a USO takes on average 10 years to 
commercialize their technology, an investor, on 
average, has to wait 10 years before a return on 
their investment can be expected. Further on, 
assuming an investment of 1 MUSD for a 20% 
equity stake, and that the investor requires a 35% 
yearly return over the investments lifetime 
(Zider, 1998), the present value of his investment 
needs to be 3,5M. Assuming a 70% discount 
rate, the USO has to be valued at 3.5 billion USD 
after 10 years. Such a valuation is highly 
unlikely. Lets further assume that the investor 
estimates to be able to sell his equity stake after 
5 years, the company still needs be valued at 
1.76 billion USD. These are very unlikely 
valuations, and followingly, few or no USOs are 
likely to attain funding if such a valuation 
process is used. This example puts in perspective 
why these companies face financing problems 
(Shane, 2004). In the following we discuss how 
uncertainty affects the applicability of the three 
most common valuation methods previously 
presented. 
Cash Flow Discounting Methods 
There are four key pieces required to use the 
cash flow discounting method: existing assets 
and the future cash flow generated by them; the 
expected growth rate of both existing assets and 
new investments; the risk adjusted discount rate 
for each of the cash flow streams; and an 
assessment of when the firm will become a 
stable growth firm which is used to estimate the 
terminal value. However, estimating any of these 
four key pieces is a significant challenge in early 
stage USOs. 
The first two criteria relate to estimating future 
cash flows. For estimating future cash flows, the 
literature review highlighted two common 
methods: the top-down and bottom-up approach. 
With the top-down approach, one starts out with 
the total market for the product, and then 
narrows down to the attainable market share of 
the focal firm. This however, because the 
technology is radical and early stage and 
followingly does not have a defined market or 
application area (Wright et al., 2006; Vohora et 
al., 2004), is not possible. Indeed it can be 
argued that the spinoff likely has mapped out 
potential markets, but how do you weight the 
sizes of each market to reach the total 
addressable market for the firm? With the 
bottom-up approach, the starting point is the 
focal company's capacity constraints, but 
because the company does not have defined 
products, it becomes meaningless to use this 
method. Again, it is possible to assume what the 
capacity constraints can turn out to be if 
successful in developing a product, but how do 
you find the probability of succeeding? 
Estimating the discount rate becomes an equally 
difficult task. Because of the technology’s early 
stage, investors cannot be certain if it is possible 
to utilize the technology in a product, or produce 
the technology at a commercial scale (Shane, 
2004). Further on, this uncertainty is 
compounded with the fact that the technology is 
radical and represents significant technological 
breakthroughs, which increases the probability of 
failing in developing the technology into a 
commercial product or service. Obviously, this 
uncertainty should be included in a discount rate, 
but how do you put a value on it? The situation 
in question is so highly unique, that it is simply 
not possible to a priori or statistically estimate 
the probability of finding an application area or 
succeeding in developing the technology to a 
commercial scale, and it is therefore highly 
difficult to account for in a risk adjusted rate. 
Moreover, the example in the introduction 
showed that the common way of handling 
uncertainty in new ventures by investors, namely 
applying high discount rates, is not possible in 
early-stage USOs. Finally, because of the early 
stages of the technology and the subsequent long 
development times these companies face, the 
time over which cash flows should be discounted 
as well as determining the terminal value is 
highly challenging. It is likely, as Knight (1921) 
writes, that people, such as founders and 
investors, will try to estimate their opinions in 
terms of probability judgments, however, 
because the instances in question are so highly 
unique, and they therefore are facing unique 
challenges not previously solved, there is simply 
no way to quantify this uncertainty. Clearly, 
estimating the parameters necessary to value an 
early stage USO using discounted cash flow 
valuation methods pose significant challenges 
due to high fundamental uncertainty, and these 
models are therefore poorly suited for valuing 
such companies. This uncertainty is a result of 
the initial technological resource endowments 
being early stage, radical and representing 
significant technological breakthroughs. 
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Balance Sheet Methods 
Balance sheet valuation methods use the firm’s 
assets and liabilities to calculate its value. In the 
case of early stage USOs, many are likely to not 
have any valuable assets in place, and if they do 
have assets, the majority of these are likely to be 
in the form of intellectual property. As 
previously stated, common methods for valuing 
intellectual property are the cost approach, 
market approach and income approach. The cost 
approach values intellectual property based on 
the investment required to replace its future 
product or service capability, often using 
historical requirements to get to the current 
technological development stage as well as 
expenses incurred. Because the technologies in 
USOs in many cases do not have a defined future 
service or product stemming from the intellectual 
property, and additionally the research being a 
result of several years of work at the university 
where researchers have access to a vast amount 
of resources such as laboratories with costly 
equipment (Shane, 2004) or experts in numerous 
fields, it is difficult to estimate the cost of 
replicating the research. In the case of the market 
approach, there are two requisites, an active 
public market and an exchange of comparable 
goods, neither of which are likely to exist for the 
unique and radical technologies which these 
companies are founded on. An even more 
compelling argument against valuing the 
intellectual property of university spinoffs with 
the use of the cost or market approach is that 
they don’t include the future revenues the 
intellectual property has the possibility to create, 
which is where the real value of the patent lies in 
the case of a USO. Finally, the income method is 
based on valuing intellectual property on its 
potential for generating future income, however, 
this requires the estimation of future cash flows 
and discount rates, which has already been 
shown above to pose significant challenges. 
Income Statement Methods 
Valuation methods based on the firm’s income 
statement are the last group of methods 
presented in this study, and rely on an income 
statement that is representative of the company’s 
long term performance, as well as the 
identification of what the market is paying for 
comparable firms. Here again, because of the 
early stages of the technology and the following 
long development times, estimating what the 
income statement will look like so far into the 
future is a nearly impossible task. Further on, 
because these companies are working with 
cutting edge technologies that are protected by 
patents, finding a comparable firm with the same 
technology characteristics is likely to prove 
difficult, rendering this group of valuation 
methods unfeasible on early stage USOs. 
As shown in the above discussion, the fact that 
initial technological resource endowments in 
USOs tend to be early stage, radical and 
represent technological breakthroughs, increases 
the uncertainty in these firms significantly, and 
make it difficult to estimate future cash flows, 
discount rates and find comparable firms, which 
renders the three most common valuation 
methods unfeasible on early stage USOs. The 
authors argue that the early stage of the 
technology, which implies that very limited 
development towards a finished product has been 
conducted, is the largest contributor to this 
uncertainty, and in fact, when succeeding in 
reaching later stages of the development, i.e. 
proving the technologies feasibility in a market 
application, radicalness and significant 
technological advances may reduce the 
uncertainty investors perceive when assessing 
the company because the new venture controls a 
superior patented technology. It is followingly 
natural to believe, that as the new venture 
develops into later stages, the uncertainty will be 
significantly reduced, and traditional valuation 
methods will again become applicable. Table 5 
summarizes how characteristics of the initial 
technological resource endowments affect the 
suitability of the above mentioned valuation 
methods.  
Conclusion and Implications 
Valuation is a central part in deciding whether 
one should invest in a company or not (Keeley et 
al., 1996), and it is often one of the more 
challenging discussions between an entrepreneur 
and the investor (Quindlen, 2000). This study 
investigates the applicability of traditional 
valuation methods on the phenomenon of 
university spinoffs, which in the last three 
decades have grown considerably in numbers 
(Rothaermel et al., 2007), and become an 
important part of the economic landscape 
(Shane, 2004; Bonardo et al., 2011; Rasmussen 
et al., 2013).  More specifically, this study 
leverages a theoretical framework comprised of 
risk and uncertainty and resource-based theory to 
pinpoint initial resource characteristics of USOs 
that render common valuation methods from 
corporate finance less applicable on these firms. 
To accomplish this, an extensive literature 
review was conducted to identify the most 
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common valuation methods used on new 
ventures, and the unique resource characteristics 
of USOs that separate these firms from other 
new ventures.  
The findings suggest that indeed, as Brush et al. 
(2001) defines, the early stage resources of these 
companies can be divided into four categories: 
human capital, social, financial technological. 
Further, using the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty as defined by Knight (1921), it has 
been shown that characteristics relating to the 
initial technological resource endowments, i.e. 
the early stage, radicalness and significant 
technical advances, introduce high levels of 
uncertainty which render valuation methods 
based on cash flow discounting, balance sheets 
and income statements unfeasible on early stage 
USOs. Additionally, the authors have briefly 
argued that it is the early stage of the technology 
that introduces the most uncertainty, and as the 
new venture progresses into more mature 
development stages and proves the feasibility of 
the technology, the uncertainty is likely to reduce 
significantly. 
The findings in this study has a vital implication 
for valuation analysts and investors: using 
common valuation methods on early-stage USOs 
may lead to erroneous valuations that do not 
reflect the true value of the firm, and which 
subsequently can lead to bad investment 
decisions. More importantly, they are likely to 
lead to many foregone investment opportunities, 
and one should show caution when using them, 
and at least be aware of their shortcomings. The 
common denominator for why traditional 
valuation methods are prone to error while used 
on early-stage USOs is the high fundamental 
uncertainty, which makes it impossible to 
reliably estimate financial outputs necessary to 
use these methods. This has big implications for 
USOs, who face the risk of not attracting 
necessary funding. The authors followingly 
recommend future research to investigate other 
valuation approaches than those of corporate 
finance, for example the applicability of 
valuation methods based on inputs such as 
resources, founder characteristics or networks, 
that can be objectively measured despite the high 
uncertainty associated with these firms, rather 
than financial outputs. In our literature search, a 
large body of literature was found on the 
relationship between resource endowments in 
USOs and performance. This literature can be 
leveraged to investigate the relationships 
between resources and firm value, with the 
underlying argument being that resources that 
lead to higher long term performance should lead 
to higher valuations. We leave this task to future 
research.  
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 Resource-based Equity Valuation of University 
Spin-off Companies: An Empirical Study  
Arif M. Mirza, Ole Rønning 
ABSTRACT 
Company valuation is a critical aspect in any deal concerning funding to new ventures. However, valuing 
an early-stage university spin-off (USO) using traditional valuation methods from corporate finance is an 
inherently difficult task. These are companies spun out of universities, often with a basis in early-stage and 
radical technologies which provide significant technical advances. These technological characteristics lead 
to high fundamental uncertainty, which makes it difficult to reliably apply valuation methods such as cash 
flow discounting or relative valuation. This is believed to be one of the reasons these companies struggle to 
receive financing in their critical early stages. This study leverages research from strategic management in 
a valuation perspective, and develops a conceptual valuation framework based on inputs (e.g. resources) 
rather than financial outputs (e.g. cash flows, balance sheets etc.). To test the framework, six hypotheses 
about the relationship between initial resource endowments and the long term equity value of an USO are 
developed with a basis in existing research on resource-performance. A sample of 63 Norwegian USOs are 
used to develop an empirical model to test the hypotheses. It is found that the degree of heterogeneity in 
the founding teams educational backgrounds and previous work experiences, the quality of the parent 
university, and the number of filed and published patents in the early stages of a USO are all positively 
related to its long term equity value. It is followingly argued that USOs who, ceteris paribus, exhibit these 
resource characteristics in their early stages should receive higher valuations than those that do not. Further 
on, a valuation framework based on resources as inputs shows promise, however significant future 
research is required to develop such a tool. 
Introduction 
Valuation is a central part in deciding whether 
one should invest in a company or not (Keeley et 
al., 1996). For venture capitalists, valuation is 
important because it determines the proportion of 
shares they receive in return for their 
investments, guides the overall profitability of 
their fund and thus also affects their relationship 
with their fund providers (Miloud et al., 2012). 
For entrepreneurs, the valuation is important 
because it sets a value on the efforts and 
resources they have put into the new venture, 
and the portion of the firm they must give up to 
obtain external financing. It has also been shown 
that fair valuation aligns the ambition of both the 
investor and entrepreneur, and that it helps to 
structure the deal between the two through the 
identification of reasonable financing terms (De 
Clercq et al., 2006). 
Valuing a young venture is however known to be 
an inherently difficult task (Timmons and 
Spinelli, 2004; Damodaran, 2009), and valuing 
an early-stage university spin-off (USO) even 
harder. Widding et al. (2009) state that high 
levels of uncertainty and capital requirements in 
these companies result in investors not having 
sufficient information to find suitable terms for 
funding. Mirza and Rønning (2015), examining 
the applicability of traditional valuation methods 
on early-stage USOs, conclude that the early 
stage, the radicalness, and the significant 
technical advancements offered by the 
technologies these companies are founded on 
lead to high fundamental uncertainty, and 
followingly that valuing a USO using one of the 
three most common valuation methods, i.e. cash 
flow discounting, balance sheet and income 
statement, is infeasible. The infeasibility of these 
methods can in large be attributed to the lack of 
operational history necessary to apply them. The 
outputs that these methods are dependent on, 
such as cash flows and balance sheets, are non 
existent for a USO in its early stages, and further 
on, because of high fundamental uncertainty, 
they are impossible to reliably estimate. 
Moreover, as Mirza and Rønning (2015) shows, 
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the common method of applying discount rates 
as high as 80% to hedge against this uncertainty 
results in almost all early-stage USOs being 
categorized as unprofitable investments. These 
valuation issues are likely to be more prevalent 
in USOs founded on technology, which require 
more capital, rather than knowledge (i.e. 
consultancy companies). Following Mirza and 
Rønning (2015), we therefore define early stage 
USOs as companies that involve transfer of 
intellectual property rights to the new venture, 
and that are either developed by faculty members 
based on their own research, or created 
specifically to capitalize on academic research 
(Shane, 2001; Colombo et al., 2010; Long, 
2002). As for their early stage nature we assume 
them to be in the opportunity framing phase in 
Vohora et al. (2002) five phase development 
model, which is where USOs first face the issue 
of raising capital.  
In the absence of the financial outputs necessary 
to apply existing valuation methods, following in 
the footsteps of Ge et al. (2005), we propose to 
leverage theories within strategic management 
that help predict and explain firm performance to 
value a company in its early stages. While 
traditional corporate finance has focused on the 
use of cash flows and returns, fields within 
strategic management have focused on the 
conditions under which superior returns can be 
achieved (Barney et al., 2001; Kor and Mahoney, 
2004; Scherer and Ross, 1990), and the latter 
should therefore in theory be suited to identify 
variables important for valuation when the 
former cannot be measured. Indeed, when it is 
difficult to value a company based on outputs 
(cash flows etc.), a method based on inputs 
(resources, founder characteristics, network etc.) 
that can be objectively measured may prove 
more satisfactory (Ge et al., 2005). 
Within the research on USOs, links between 
initial resource endowments and subsequent 
performance has received notable attention 
(Rasmussen et al., 2012). Based on this research 
the authors investigate whether these initial 
resource endowments can be used as predictors 
in the early stages of a USO for what the long 
term value of the firm will be, and as such lay 
the foundation for a resource-based valuation 
framework. It is not the goal of the authors to 
develop an entire valuation framework. Rather 
we seek to investigate its feasibility, and develop 
a conceptual framework to lay the stepping stone 
for future research on the topic. This study, 
which to our knowledge is the first of its kind, 
aims to bring the research on university spin-off 
performance and equity valuation together. We 
review existing literature and develop an 
analytical model to investigate the following 
research question: 
RQ: How can initial resource 
endowments be used to assess the 
early-stage value of a USO? 
The above research question can further be 
justified by two important reasons. First, USOs 
are ventures that require significant amounts of 
capital in their early stages (Shane, 2004; 
Clarysse and Bruneel, 2007; Neck et al., 2004), 
but that find it difficult to acquire the sufficient 
amount of funding. This is partially due to the 
long development times associated with USOs 
(Shane, 2004; Rasmussen et al., 2012), where 
investors prefer a short time to market, as well as 
investors not being able to adequately assess the 
value of the companies due to uncertainty. 
Through this study the authors therefore hope to 
establish the initial theoretical linkages for 
developing a valuation framework with which 
investors can adequately assess the value of 
early-stage USOs, and thereby reduce the 
financing gap these companies experience 
(Shane, 2004).  
Second, USOs, when successful, generate 
significant economic value (Shane, 2004), and 
the authors believe that better valuation methods 
may not only lead to increased flow of financing 
as well as more appropriate funding terms for 
these firms, but also greater wealth creation in 
society. Bonardo et al. (2011), for example, 
found that one-fourth of the high-tech SMEs that 
went public in Europe during the period 1995-
2003 were USOs, and concludes that university-
based firms represent a significant contribution 
to European financial markets.   
This study is divided into five parts, where this 
introduction constitutes the first part. In the 
second part we develop hypotheses with a basis 
in resource-based theory and resource-
performance relationships highlighted in existing 
research streams. In the third part we present the 
analytical methodology employed to test our 
hypotheses, and finally in part four we present 
and discuss our results and finish off with 
implications and areas for future research in part 
five. 
Theoretical Framework and 
Hypotheses 
Mirza and Rønning (2015) find that high 
fundamental uncertainty in USOs makes it 
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difficult to reliably forecast financial outputs, 
which renders traditional valuation methods 
difficult to apply. The authors argue that the 
forecasting process can in its simplest form be 
broken down to a problem of making an 
assessment under uncertainty, and from 
cognitive psychology it is known that to cope 
with such uncertainty, heuristics are commonly 
applied (Gigerenzer et al., 2011). Heuristics are 
efficient cognitive processes, or mental 
shortcuts, used to make decisions without 
assessing all the necessary information one 
would want to make an optimal decision, and 
research on the use of heuristics has in fact 
shown that they can lead to more accurate 
judgments than weighing and analyzing 
information in an uncertain situation (Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier, 2011). Gigerenzer et al. (2011) 
write that heuristics exploit the information 
structure of the environment, and that they in a 
world full of uncertainties and surprises often 
lead to more accurate assessments than complex 
methods.  
In the context of valuation, instead of calculating 
highly uncertain cash flows, or estimating 
probabilities that are impossible to estimate, it 
then seems logical to cope with uncertainty in 
the same manner, and value early-stage USOs by 
applying heuristics.  To identify such heuristics, 
it becomes necessary to look towards theories 
from strategic management that help predict firm 
performance, i.e. theories that can be used to ex 
ante assess the performance, and subsequently 
the value, of a USO. There are especially two 
such theories that have received notable 
attention, namely the resource-based perspective, 
which views a firm as a bundle of resources that 
ultimately drives performance (Penrose, 1959), 
and the Industrial Organization perspective, 
which emphasizes external forces and the 
structure of the market as the driver of 
performance (Porter, 1981). The authors argue 
that the former of these is best suited in the 
context of valuing early-stage USOs. Whilst the 
latter is dependent on many factors outside the 
new ventures control and can rapidly change, 
resources define and distinguish a company from 
others (Miller, 2003; Penrose, 1995), are 
objectively measurable despite uncertainty, and 
help explain superior firm performance (Kor and 
Mahoney, 2004). As Barney (1991) writes, 
resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable and 
nonsubstitutable (VRIN) have the potential to 
create sustained competitive advantages, if the 
company has the necessary capabilities to utilize 
them in a value-creating manner (Mahoney and 
Pandian, 1992; Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; 
Brush et al., 2001). Theoretically speaking then, 
a firm with certain resources, when utilized the 
right way, should, ceteris paribus, perform better 
than firms that do not have the same resources 
because of their competitive advantages. These 
advantages should lead to higher financial 
returns, and subsequently higher firm values. A 
firm that exhibits these resources in its early 
stages should followingly be valued higher than 
a firm that does not. The obvious limitation to 
this approach is that the performance impact of 
resources are dependent on the USOs capability 
to utilize them (Barney and Clark, 2007; 
Mahoney and Pandian, 1992), however, this is 
difficult to measure ex ante. For the purpose of 
this study, and in the context of valuation, the 
closest proxy is then whether the resource is 
available to the firm or not. These reflections 
lead us to develop the conceptual framework 
presented in figure 1, where resources are used 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
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as valuation inputs rather than financial data. 
Whilst traditional valuation methods emphasize 
the use of financial returns as inputs, our 
conceptual framework leverages the fundamental 
drivers of these returns, namely resources. 
Moreover, resources are ex ante measurements 
which can be used in even the early stages of a 
USO, whilst financial returns are ex post 
measurements and therefore more applicable to 
mature ventures. As can be seen, the 
performance of the firm, and subsequently the 
financial returns, are also dependent on the 
company's capabilities to utilize the resources. 
However, this input is not available ex ante. 
To test the conceptual framework empirically, 
we present in the following resource-
performance relationships in USOs identified by 
previous researchers, and use this to hypothesize 
relationships between initial resource 
endowments, and the long term equity value of a 
firm. We further on argue that resources with a 
proven relationship to a USOs long term equity 
value can be used as heuristics in the early stages 
of a USO to predict its early stage value. We 
build upon the resource-based theory presented 
by Mirza and Rønning (2015), and structure our 
discussion in accordance with (Mustar et al., 
2006), who find that the four resource categories 
human, social, financial, and, technology, are 
especially important for research-based USOs. 
Human Resources 
Wright et al. (1994) write that human capital can 
be valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable, and therefore be the source of 
sustained competitive advantages. Building on 
the work of Steffy and Maurer (1988), who state 
that both the demand of labor and the supply of 
labor is heterogeneous, i.e. that companies 
require different skills, and that individuals differ 
in the skills they possess, they argue that 
individuals contribute differently to a firm, and 
human capital can therefore create value. It is 
also generally a consensus amongst researchers 
that higher quality human resources lead to 
higher financial value for firms (Boudreau, 1983; 
Boudreau and Berger, 1985). Wright et al. 
(1994) go on to write that human capital can 
indeed be rare, if one proxies the quality of 
human capital by cognitive abilities, and the fact 
that these cognitive abilities are normally 
distributed in the population (Jensen, 1980). 
Inimitability arises due to unique historical 
conditions, causal ambiguity and social 
complexity, which complicate the process of 
duplicating relevant components of the human 
capital resource pool and the circumstances 
under which these resources function. Lastly, 
Wright et al. (1994) argue that human resources 
are non-substitutable because they are 
generalizable, i.e. can constantly be developed to 
ensure that they do not become obsolete, and 
therefore the only resources that can substitute 
them are themselves rare, valuable, inimitable, 
and non-substitutable. 
In the context of new technology ventures, 
human capital in terms of entrepreneurial roles 
and capabilities is generally highlighted as a key 
resource (Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Newbert, 
2007), and in early stage USOs, which often 
have scarce initial resources, human capital in 
terms of founders and their experience is one of 
the most important resources the new venture 
has (Shane and Stuart, 2002; Shane, 2004; 
Colombo and Piva, 2012). Particularly inventor 
presence and the diversity in the founding teams 
background and experience are highlighted as 
two important human capital factors impacting 
firm performance. 
USOs are usually formed around a technology at 
embryonic stages (Agarwal and Shah, 2014), and 
knowledge to develop, modify or tailor the 
technology and associated products or services to 
meet customer requirements is essential for 
startup success (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; 
Zucker et al., 1998; Knockaert et al., 2011). This 
knowledge is highly tacit, and is typically 
embodied in the technology inventor (Clarysse et 
al., 2007; Markman et al., 2008; Wright et al., 
1994). Due to the difficulty in communicating 
tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 2012), the inventor is 
an important asset to exploit the technology, and 
numerous studies have highlighted the 
importance of inventor presence in the new 
venture founding team to achieve high firm 
performance (Olofsson and Wahlbin, 1984; 
Roberts and Hauptman, 1986; Hess and 
Rothaermel, 2012; Zucker et al., 2002). Olofsson 
and Wahlbin (1984) and Djokovic and Souitaris 
(2008) find that the USOs with the highest 
growth rates are the companies that involve 
academics who leave the university, and Roberts 
and Hauptman (1986) argue that the advantage 
of keeping academics close to the new venture is 
due to increased effectiveness of the technology 
transfer process. This is supported by several 
scholars (Hess and Rothaermel, 2012; Zucker et 
al., 2002). Knockaert et al. (2010) found that in 
USOs, where the majority of the initial 
researchers became a part of the founding team, 
the tacit knowledge was transferred effectively 
and at a sufficient speed, which resulted in 
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higher valuations of the firm shares. This leads 
them to conclude that the greater the proportion 
of the research team that joins the USO as 
founders, the greater the performance. Based on 
these findings we hypothesize: 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, USOs who in 
their early stages have the 
technology inventors on the 
founding team achieve higher long 
term equity valuations than those 
that do not. 
The performance impact of inventors in founding 
teams is further found to be affected by how 
renowned the inventor is. USOs that are founded 
on the research of a “star” researcher or have a 
“star” on the founding team can benefit from the 
researcher’s reputation. Stars have a strong 
ability to send a credible signal about 
unobserved quality of the new venture to 
external actors (Spence and Michael, 1974). 
Fuller and Rothaermel (2012), examining 238 
USOs in the United States, find that new 
ventures with star scientists are more likely to 
achieve IPOs, and Higgins et al. (2011) find that 
USOs with star researchers achieve higher IPO 
valuations. Zucker et al. (1998), examining the 
biotechnology sector, show that star scientists 
have a direct effect on time to IPO and amount 
of money obtained at IPO. These findings 
indicate that the renownedness of the inventor 
within her field is related to the USOs 
performance, and subsequently the long term 
value of the firm. This is primarily due to three 
reasons: first, the more renowned the inventor is 
within her field, the more likely it is that the 
research underlying the technology is cutting 
edge and of high quality. Second, more 
renowned inventors have more to lose if they are 
unsuccessful in starting a new venture due to the 
reputational impacts. Therefore, the fact that she 
is willing to bet on the technology sends a strong 
signal about its quality (Fuller and Rothaermel, 
2012), and should ease the process of obtaining 
funding and establishing partnerships and 
alliances, which ultimately should increase firm 
growth. Third, the more renowned the inventor 
is, the easier it should be to attract additional 
human resources, particularly technological 
human resources because of aspiring talent 
wishing to work with her. This leads us to the 
following hypothesis: 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, USOs who in 
their early stages have more 
renowned inventors on the 
founding team achieve higher 
equity valuations in the long term 
than those that do not. 
However important the presence of the 
technology inventors, spinning off a company 
with people exclusively from the parent 
university can have negative effects on 
performance, and an effective combination of 
top management team with both business and 
engineering knowledge and experience, is a 
common denominator for USO performance and 
successful ventures (Gurdon and Samsom, 2010; 
Roberts, 1991; Doutriaux and Barker, 1995; 
Visintin and Pittino, 2014; Heirman and 
Clarysse, 2004). Shane (2004) writes that it is 
important for the founding team to have 
knowledge about business, management, product 
development, production and markets. Grandi 
and Grimaldi (2005) conclude that successful 
academic ventures are dependent on founding 
teams that combine individuals with different 
attitudes, which increases interaction and 
communication within the founding team, as 
well as the allocation of work tasks based on 
personal attitudes. Further, they write that 
academic entrepreneurs should devote time to 
choosing team members that have different 
characteristics and are able to take on different 
roles (Grandi and Grimaldi, 2005). Thus, at least 
in the startup phase, it is vital to create 
differentiated team structures where members 
have both research and business profiles 
(Visintin and Pittino, 2014) because the team is 
then better able to adjust to the complex 
environmental challenges with which they are 
confronted (Wright et al., 2012). Knockaert et al. 
(2011) find that it is important for USOs to also 
have a commercial mindset to be alert to external 
market movements, and they conclude that 
incorporating knowledge about the technology 
and a commercial mindset in the USOs founding 
team leads to enhanced performance. It logically 
follows then, that USOs that are able to diversify 
in educational backgrounds and previous work 
experiences in the founding team should perform 
better, and subsequently achieve higher 
valuations than those that do not. 
Being more specific, Rothaermel et al. (2007) 
write that experience, capabilities, and 
knowledge from the industry are critical factors 
to the success of a spin-off, yet many, if not 
most, management teams lack these capabilities, 
negatively affecting their ability to recruit new 
employees and attract early stage capital 
(Clarysse and Moray, 2004; O'Shea et al., 2005; 
Hayter, 2013). In agreement, Shane and Stuart 
(2002) find that industry experience is 
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significantly related to time-to-IPO. Finally, 
Criaco et al. (2013) show that founders with 
entrepreneurial education and university 
experience in terms of research and teaching 
positively affect firm survival. We hypothesize: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, USOs who in 
their early stages have founding 
teams that are more heterogeneous 
in educational backgrounds and 
work experiences achieve higher 
equity valuations in the long term 
than those with more homogeneous 
founding teams. 
Social Resources 
It is generally agreed upon that a high level of 
social capital, in terms of personal relationships, 
often assist in providing access to venture 
capitalists, business information and potential 
customers (Florin et al., 2003), and the social 
capital of founders has therefore been noted in 
entrepreneurship literature to have several 
positive impacts on new ventures. Social 
resources can be valuable because they can 
provide access to information and advice (Hoang 
and Antoncic, 2003), key talent and market 
information (Freeman, 1999), and as Brush et al. 
(2001) writes, social resources can be used to 
create an image of success that can be leveraged 
to obtain other benefits, such as cooperation and 
trust, financial resources, or assets and 
equipment purchased at less expensive prices. 
Social resources can for obvious reasons be rare 
as relationships to more prominent entities are 
more difficult to obtain. Inimitability is likely 
due to relationships being built over time and 
being path dependent (Zander and Zander, 2005; 
Santala and Parvinen, 2007). Finally, social 
resources can be non-substitutable due to each 
entity in the relationship being unique in terms of 
experiences, resources, and networks. 
In entrepreneurship literature, social ties of 
founders are shown to reduce informational 
asymmetries between founders and potential 
investors and partners (Shane and Cable, 2002), 
and resources made available through 
entrepreneurial networks are shown to greatly 
enhance the survival and growth of new firms 
(Brüderl et al., 1992). In new high-tech firms, 
who are generally believed to have higher 
informational asymmetries, social ties are 
especially acknowledged to be critically 
important (Bidault and Cummings, 1994; Stuart, 
2000). 
Walter et al. (2006), examining the impact of 
USOs ability to develop and utilize inter-
organizational relationships, highlight 
relationships to research institutions, legal 
authorities, customers, and suppliers as 
particularly important to attain growth due to 
lacking internal markets and industry knowledge 
amongst founders. They argue that these 
relationships allow the USO to target a larger 
market in less time, learn about customers to 
develop marketable offerings, and ensure timely 
and state-of-the-art resources. Followingly they 
find that sales growth, profit attainment, realized 
competitive advantages, and long-term survival 
are influenced by a USOs ability to develop 
external relationships  
Ties to the parent university are particularly 
highlighted in previous research as important for 
USO performance. Rothaermel and Thursby 
(2005) write that USOs with strong ties to their 
parent organization are less likely to fail. 
Colombo and Grilli (2010) find that universities 
influence the growth rates of local USOs, and 
Bonardo et al. (2011) state that for firms that 
have chosen to go public, the ones that publicize 
that they are a university spinoff experience that 
their origins are beneficial, and that university 
affiliation is positively recognized by investors 
through enhanced valuations. University 
affiliation also enhances the acquisition 
attractiveness to other companies, and the 
advantage of the affiliation is correlated with the 
presence of academics in the top management 
team (Bonardo et al., 2011). A strong affiliation 
between the USO and its parent university is 
further likely to be valuable because the parent 
can provide access to resources such as talent 
and critical financial resources (Bigliardi et al., 
2013), knowledge and complementary R&D 
(Lubik et al., 2013), labs, and expensive 
equipment at low cost (Starr and MacMillan, 
1990; Roberts and Malonet, 1996). We therefore 
hypothesize: 
H3a: Ceteris paribus, USOs who in 
their early stages have strong ties 
to the parent university achieve 
higher long term equity valuations 
than those with weak ties.  
The performance effect of having strong ties to 
the parent university is further found to be 
dependent on the quality of the university. 
Colombo and Grilli (2010) state that the quality 
of the research conducted at the university has a 
positive impact on the growth rate of the spin 
off, establishing a theoretical link between 
university quality and USO performance. Powers 
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and McDougall (2005) write that access to 
people with expert knowledge and talent is a 
critical human capital resource needed for the 
development of cutting-edge technology, which 
are more likely to be present in more renowned 
universities, and finds that faculty quality 
impacts the number of USOs from the university 
that go public. Further on, Di Gregorio and 
Shane (2003) suggest that it is easier for 
academics at high ranked universities to get 
funding for their startups due to their increased 
credibility. In support, O'Shea et al. (2005) 
conclude that the presence of top ranked science 
and engineering students and faculty is positively 
correlated with USO performance. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
H3b: Ceteris paribus, USOs 
originating from high quality 
universities achieve higher equity 
valuations in the long term than 
those originating from lower 
quality universities. 
Financial Resources 
Due to the early stages of the technologies on 
which many USOs are founded, the development 
process is long (Rasmussen et al., 2013) and 
resource demanding (Shane, 2004; Clarysse et 
al., 2011), and access to financial resources is 
typically seen as the most important factor for 
USO growth (Hellman and Puri, 2000; Heirman 
and Clarysse, 2004; Shane and Stuart, 2002; 
Clarysse et al., 2011). Financial resources are 
obviously valuable, as they enable the firm to 
acquire necessary resources, and can also be 
rare, because the demand is larger than the 
supply. However, financial resources are neither 
inimitable nor non-substitutable, and can 
therefore not on their own be a source of 
achieving sustained competitive advantages. 
They do however enable the firm to acquire 
other resources that are VRIN, and can therefore 
from a resource-based perspective indirectly be 
tied to performance.  
Gurdon and Samsom (2010), interviewing 22 US 
and Canadian USOs find that access to capital 
was a common denominator amongst the 
successful ventures, and Hayter (2013) argues 
that USOs that receive venture capital have a 
20% to 26% higher likelihood of 
commercialization success compared with USOs 
that do not. In support, Zerbinati et al. (2012), 
measuring performance in terms of employment 
growth, find that the higher the amount of capital 
a USO attracts in its early stages, the higher is 
the annual employment growth of the new 
venture, and conclude that initial capital invested 
in USOs is a major predictor for early growth. 
Further on, initial capital invested in USOs is 
tied to the ability to raise capital later in the 
startup process, which is identified as the single 
most important factor for achieving an IPO 
(Hayter, 2013; Clarysse et al., 2011). We 
followingly propose: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, USOs that 
receive investor capital in their 
early stages achieve higher equity 
valuations in the long term than 
those that do not. 
It is important to note here the inherent reverse 
causality of capital on firm valuation. It is 
obvious that raising capital will increase the 
value of a firm equivalent to the amount of 
capital raised, known as pre-money and post-
money valuations. The authors however argue 
that this is not equivalent to increasing the long-
term value of the firm, where the actual 
utilization of the capital will be the determining 
factor, which is the relationship this study 
investigates. Reverse causality followingly does 
not bias the hypothesis. 
Technical Resources 
Shane and Stuart (2002), following Merges and 
Nelson (1990), argue that the strength of a 
USO’s technological endowments at founding is 
an important predictor of its subsequent 
performance because these companies do not 
have complementary assets in place. From a 
venture capitalist standpoint, Knockaert et al. 
(2006) show that strong technology endowments 
and intellectual property protection are valued 
when deciding to invest in high-tech startups. 
Pérez Pérez and Sánchez (2003) summarize by 
stating that at least initially, USO success is 
more dependent on technological development 
(i.e. strong technological resources) than 
marketing, sales, and distribution.  
From a resource-based perspective, 
technological resources can indeed lead to 
sustained competitive advantages. The resources 
can be valuable as they enable a firm to conceive 
of or implement strategies that improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991). 
They can be rare in terms of the resources being 
uniquely owned by the firm, through for example 
intellectual property rights. Inimitable because of 
intellectual property rights, or in the case of 
physical technology, the exploitation may 
involve socially complex resources where only 
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firms that possess the necessary culture, 
traditions and social relations can fully exploit 
the technology (Wilkins, 1989). Further on, 
Narayanan (2000) characterize the knowledge 
underlying the endowed technology along three 
dimensions: scope, newness, and tacitness. The 
latter of these, i.e. a high degree of tacitness, can 
make imitation difficult. The two former can 
lead to non-substitutability, where broad 
technological scopes in terms of platform 
applications, and newness in terms of the degree 
with which the innovation departures from 
existing technologies (Bierly et al., 2009), can 
make the technology difficult to substitute. 
Investigating patents as technological resources, 
previous research indicates they can be a 
valuable organizational resource for competitive 
advantage, and predictive of firm performance 
(e.g., Deeds et al. (2000), Zahra and Bogner 
(2000), Powers and McDougall (2005)). A 
rational inventor is only likely to patent an 
invention when the expected payoff from 
holding the patent outways the cost of obtaining 
it (Long, 2002). Followingly, patents have 
important signaling effects towards external 
resource holders, where more patents signal 
higher expected returns. Further on, Hsu and 
Ziedonis (2008) for example finds that patents 
act as signals towards investors for the venture’s 
quality when they need it most, namely in the 
early stages of development when uncertainty is 
at its largest. 
In the context of USOs, Shane and Stuart (2002) 
establish a linkage between patents and 
performance, arguing that that the larger the 
number of patents held by a USO at the time of 
founding, the smaller the chance of failure. 
Kamiyama and Sheehan (2006) see that firms 
increasingly are exploiting their patents as a 
means of tapping into external sources of 
financing. Ownership of patents can demonstrate 
to potential investors that a small firm has a 
novel invention with which it may be able to 
differentiate its products or services from those 
of its competitors, as well as the legal means to 
prevent competitors from implementing their 
invention in the marketplace. Supporting this, 
Clarysse et al. (2007) find that the perceived 
quality of the endowed technology of the USO, 
measured in number of patents, enable larger 
amounts of startup capital to be obtained. Thus, 
because patents can play a large role in enabling 
firms to attract venture capital investments, they 
can also affect firm performance, as funding is 
seen as an important factor for achieving new 
venture success (Zerbinati et al., 2012; Hellman 
and Puri, 2000). Therefore we propose: 
H5: Ceteris Paribus, USOs with 
more patents in their early stages 
achieve higher equity valuations in 
the long term than those with less 
patents. 
The above discussion can be summarized in the 
conceptual framework presented in figure 2. 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework 
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Research Methodology 
To test the developed hypotheses we employ a 
cross-sectional quantitative method. More 
specifically, we use multiple linear regression. 
Data Sources and Case Selection  
The sample we analyze comprises of 63 firms 
from the Enter research project which uses the 
Norwegian FORNY program as its empirical 
context. Established in 1995, FORNY is a 
program initiated by The Research Council of 
Norway to commercialize results from publicly 
financed research institutions (Rasmussen et al., 
2013), with a general objective being to increase 
wealth creation in Norway (Borlaug and STEP, 
2009). EntPro is a project initiated to follow the 
development of the companies in the FORNY 
portfolio, which as of mid 2013 consisted of 474 
science-based companies (Rasmussen et al., 
2013). Due to financial incentives for registering 
a firm in the program as well as legislative 
change in Norway in 2003 that, similar to the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the US, grants 
intellectual property rights to the parent 
institution instead of the individual researcher, it 
is reasonable to say that the EntPro database 
covers the majority of the population of science-
based firms in Norway established after 2000. 
This eliminates sampling biases in our study 
which are common in entrepreneurial research 
(Short et al., 2010; Mullen et al., 2009). The 
database consists of business plans, corporate 
announcements from the Norwegian business 
registry, annual reports, news articles, survey 
data and context-level data on institutional 
factors. Further on, this data has for the majority 
of the USOs in the database been structured and 
coded into a standardized template by a prior 
research group, as a part of a larger research 
project between NTNU and Bodø Business 
School. A great strength in using the EntPro 
database as a primary source of data is that 
companies that are no longer in official registers 
are still in the EntPro database, which eliminates 
survival bias in our sample.  
Seen on an international scale, the EntPro 
database provides a vast amount of unique data 
on the USOs in our sample. To supplement this, 
additional data was collected through online 
sources. For example, information about the 
founding team was missing in many business 
plans, patent information was rarely mentioned, 
and the latest annual reports where sometimes 
not available. To retrieve the missing 
information we used Proff1 to retrieve financial 
information, Google Patents for patent 
information, Google Citations for citation rates, 
and LinkedIn as well as university websites for 
information about founders.  
The sample of 63 firms was identified through a 
funneling process. First, because the EntPro 
database covers the entire population of science-
based firms, all firms not originating at a 
university and not adhering to the definition of 
USOs used in this paper were excluded. 
Thereafter, we limited our sample to companies 
established between 2000 and 2005. This is due 
to data being insufficient for companies 
established in 1999 or earlier, and research 
indicating that USOs take an average of 10 years 
to commercialize their technology (Rasmussen et 
al., 2013; Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006). By 
limiting our sample to companies that have been 
active at least a certain number of years, we limit 
the possible bias from including companies that 
have not come far enough in the 
commercialization process to be valued properly, 
and therefore receive erroneous valuations.  
After this first step, a total of 72 firms were left 
in the sample. To retrieve and structure relevant 
data for our specific research, a codebook was 
developed where all relevant variables where 
operationalized into objective measures. This 
resulted in a total of 65 variables, and the final 
variable codebook can be found in the appendix2. 
The coding scheme was reviewed with a senior 
researcher3 at NTNU to ensure its validity. Each 
USO was coded by a single researcher on the 
team to ensure internal coding reliability in each 
observation, and subsequently saved in a master 
template containing all the USOs. To reduce 
possible bias from not having several researchers 
assess the same venture, the researchers together 
developed a set of coding criteria for each 
variable. The coding was conducted in two 
phases. First, information in the EntPro database 
was reviewed. In phase two, the missing 
information was retrieved through additional 
information sources such as previously 
mentioned Proff, Google Patents, Google 
Citations and LinkedIn.  
Upon completion of coding the 72 USOs in our 
sample, 9 USOs were excluded. Five companies 
were excluded due to difficulties in estimating 
their values. This was because the companies at 
                                                        
1 Proff.no is a leading provider of in-debt financial data 
on Norwegian registered firms. 
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the time of measurement had not completed their 
product development, and subsequently had not 
conducted their first commercial sale. Because 
these companies had no or low revenues, 
including these companies in the sample would 
have resulted in serious valuation errors. Four 
companies were excluded due to changes in 
organizational structures that made it impossible 
to code the original firm and its resources. This 
left a final sample of 63 firms. 
Variable Measurements 
When employing a quantitative method, it is 
necessary to identify relevant variables, relate 
those variables to the hypothesis in question, and 
finally use valid and reliable measurements to 
conduct the analysis (Creswell, 2003). There is 
no single way to operationalize the variables 
used in our analysis, however, as far as the 
availability of data allows it, we follow the 
established definitions employed in existing 
research, and acknowledge limitations when that 
is not possible. 
Dependent Variable 
This study investigates the relationship between 
initial resources and firm value, and the 
dependent variable is followingly firm value. 
Several limitations, therein access to valuation 
data as well as the validity of valuations 
conducted by third parties which are often 
dependent on contractual terms (Damodaran, 
2012), led us to firsthand value each company in 
our sample. Amongst the three most common 
valuation methods, the cash flow discounting 
method requires a greater insight into the 
company's financials and future growth than 
what was possible for us to retrieve, whilst 
valuing the firms using a balance sheet approach 
would not have included the future profit 
potential in these firms (Mirza and Rønning, 
2015). We therefore opted to use the income 
statement method relative valuation, also known 
as the multiples approach. Mirza and Rønning 
(2015) find that relative valuation is not suitable 
for early-stage firms. However, as we are 
assessing the firm values at more mature stages 
(companies in our sample are founded during or 
prior to 2005, and the majority of firm values are 
calculated using data from 2013), one of the 
major obstacles of lacking financial outputs is 
removed. Further on, we removed from our 
sample firms that at the time of measurement had 
not conducted their first commercial sale to 
eliminate companies with unrepresentative 
revenues of normal operations. Although there 
are several limitations to our measure of firm 
value, which we return to later in the paper, a 
great strength is its simplicity. A limited amount 
of financial data is necessary to apply the 
method, and it implicitly forecasts future 
expected cash flows (Baker and Ruback, 1999). 
Moreover, valuing a mature company using a 
multiple of an operating or financial measure is a 
common and popular approach. Using third-
party valuations on the other hand, which for 
private firms are often affected by contractual 
terms such as vesting of capital and differences 
in equity claims (Damodaran, 2009), would have 
biased our dependent variable as we would not 
be able to identify, and followingly adjust values 
for, such terms. Lastly it would be difficult to 
obtain up-to-date valuations on each firm. These 
limitations restricted our valuation options to 
relative valuation.  
Mirza and Rønning (2015) outline the process of 
valuing a firm using relative valuation. In this 
study we use industry multiples to average out 
the errors that would occur if a multiple from a 
single comparable firm was used instead. The 
use of industry classifications to identify 
multiples is a common practice in valuation 
research (Liu et al., 2002). The question 
regarding which specific multiple to use has 
received a lot of attention in corporate finance, 
and there seems to be consensus that earnings-
multiples perform the best (Liu et al., 2002). 
However, Damodaran (2012) writes that sales-
multiples can be more appropriate when the firm 
has negative earnings. Further on, many 
valuation studies focus on enterprise multiples as 
they ignore the effects of different capital 
structures by valuing both equity and debt (Deng 
et al., 2012). Because the companies in our 
sample are likely to vary in capital structures, we 
use enterprise value-multiples. Moreover, we use 
two different scaling factors: in accordance with 
the established acceptance that earnings-
multiples perform better we use EBITDA as a 
scaling factor on companies that show stable 
earnings without large extraordinary 
development expenses. If a company does 
display such extraordinary expenses, using 
EBITDA will not be representative of how the 
company is likely to do financially when the 
development costs are removed, and using 
EBITDA as a scaling factor will subsequently 
result in large valuation errors. In accordance 
with Damodaran (2012), we use the EV/sales-
multiple on these companies instead. A more 
objective approach would have been to 
consistently use one specific multiple, or an 
average of the two, on all companies. However, 
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valuation is a subjective process, and being 
rigorous on this would likely have resulted in 
more inaccurate valuations because of the lack of 
customization. Our process of valuing each firm 
can be divided into five steps: 
Step 1: First, each company was classified as 
either unsuccessful, still operating, acquired or 
completed IPO. None of the firms in our sample 
had completed an IPO, and this category was 
therefore removed. 
Step 2: To retrieve relevant industry multiples, 
each company in each category was mapped to 
two industries using industry classifications4. 
Two data sources with different industry 
classifications were used due to difficulties in 
placing some of the firms in our sample using 
only one of the classifications. To assure a good 
industry match, other companies in the chosen 
industry were assessed to assure that the core 
activities matched those of the USO being 
valued. 
Step 3: Each company in each category was 
thereafter valued at time T, where T represents 
the earliest point in time an investor could have 
exited their investment in the USO. For acquired 
companies, T represents the year the company 
was acquired. For still operating firms, T 
represents the year of the latest available annual 
report. 
Table 1 summarizes the valuation method for 
each category of firms. 
 
Table 1. Valuation method for each category of firms 
                                                        
4 Professor Damodaran at Stern University 
(http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/), as well as 
Ycharts, an online provider of financial data. Professor 
Damodaran lists 95 industries, whilst the second data 
source lists 148. 
Step 4: As previously mentioned, using 
enterprise-multiples to value a firm results in the 
enterprise value, which Liu et al. (2002) defines 
as: !"#$%&%'($)*+,-$ = /+%0$#)*+,-$)12)$3-'#4 +)6110)*+,-$)12)7$6# −)(:+(ℎ)+"7):+(ℎ)$3-'*+,$"#())
 
Because we are only interested in the return to a 
potential investor, the market value of equity for 
each firm was calculated by subtracting debt in 
the company from the enterprise value, and 
subsequently adding in cash and cash 
equivalents. =+,-$)12)$3-'#4 = !"#$%&%'($)*+,-$ −)6110)*+,-$)12)7$6# +)(:+(ℎ)+"7):+(ℎ)$3-'*+,$"#() )
Step 5: Because we used public multiples to 
value the majority of firms in our sample, an 
illiquidity discount was applied. Compared to 
public firms, investments in private firms are 
illiquid because of fewer buyers/sellers and 
substantial transaction costs when conducting a 
buy/sale (Damodaran, 2005). Followingly, when 
valuing equity in a private company based on 
public company multiples, one should include an 
illiquidity discount rate. Although illiquidity 
discounts often are applied as a fixed rate 
between 25-35%, Damodaran (2005) argues that 
they are highly firm specific, and although there 
is no easy way to determine this discount, 
illiquidity discounts should be adjusted to each 
firm. Silber (1991) developed an equation5 to 
calculate the size of the liquidity discount by 
analyzing the valuation difference between a 
company's public and restricted stock. He finds 
that the illiquidity discount is dependent on the 
firm’s revenues, the proportion of restricted 
stock to publically traded stock, if the company 
has positive earnings, and if there is a customer 
relationship between the investor and the firm. 
Although Silber (1991) based his analysis on 
public firms using restricted stock, Damodaran 
(2005) points outs that he does provide a 
roadmap for how to calculate private firm 
discounts. For the lack of better ways, an 
illiquidity discount using Silber (1991) equation 
                                                        
5 Appendix 7 
Company(Status Definition Valuation(Method
Unsuccessful 1.+Company+is+removed+from+
official+business+registers+and+
there+is+no+information+
indicating+a+merger+or+
aquisition.
2.+Company+has+abondoned+
original+business+idea
Firm+value+set+to+0
Still+operating Annual+report+showing+activity+
and+the+company+has+
conducted+their+first+
commercial+sale
Valued+using+EV/EBITDA+or+EV/Sales.
Acquired 100%+of+the+company's+shares+
have+been+bought+by+another+
company
Valued+equal+to+the+acquisition+
amount,+if+available.+If+not,+valued+
using+acquisition+or+IPO+multiples+
(Price/sales)+from+similar+companies+in+
terms+of+products+or+services+being+
sold.+The+use+of+multiples+to+value+and+
acquisition+target+is+used+in+more+than+
50%+of+all+acquisitions+(Damodaran,+
1996).
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was followingly calculated for each firm in our 
sample and applied to the equity value calculated 
in the previous step. The final valuation equation 
used in this study can be summarized as 
following: 
=' = !3-'#4)*+,-$'>,,'3-'7'#4)7'(:1-"#')!3-'#4)*+,-$? =)=+,-#'1")@-,#'&,$)×)B:+,'"C)2+:#1%− D$6# + (E+(ℎ)+"7):+(ℎ)$3-'*+,$"#()
where Valuation)multiple = The multiple used: either 
EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales or, if acquisition, 
P/Sales.  Scaling)factor = EBITDA or sales in year T for the 
firm being valued. Debti = Book value of firm i’s debt in year T (Cash)&)Cash)equivalents)i = Cash and cash 
equivalents held by firm i in year T 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables in our study consist of 
the resources with which we have hypothesized a 
relationship to firm value. The variables are 
measured through proxies, and because we are 
interested in early-stage predictors of a USOs 
value, they are measured at the end of the second 
year of operations. The second year, instead of 
the first, is chosen to account for differences in 
time of founding during the first calendar year. 
Measuring the variables at the end of the second 
year also limits biases that might occur when 
companies are registered prior to establishing a 
proper organization, and that are likely to 
experience changes in management during the 
first couple of months. Further on, founding 
team members are defined as individuals with 
equity in the new venture. 
Inventor on Founding Team (H1a) 
We use a dummy variable to indicate whether 
the technology inventor is present in the 
founding team. The variable is coded 1 if at least 
one (if there are several) inventor is present in 
the founding team. This was coded by first 
identifying the inventor name(s) using the 
ventures business plan, and subsequently 
reviewing annual reports to identify if the 
inventor had an equity stake in the company. 
Inventor Renownedness (H1b) 
Fuller and Rothaermel (2012) proxy the presence 
of a star inventor by her inclusion in the top one 
half of one percent of cited scholars in her field. 
A citation represents evidence that the person 
being cited has done work that is viewed as 
relevant to the current research frontier (Jr, 
1986). Cole and Cole (1967) argue that citations 
can be viewed as a form of recognition, and 
Diamond (1984) that citations can be used as a 
proxy for a researcher's ability to do quality 
research. Following this, we use the total number 
of citations on any article, authored or co-
authored by the firm founders, as a proxy for 
how renowned the inventor is. All founders are 
included due to difficulties in separating 
inventors from founders in many of the case 
firms. For each founder, a “My citations” profile 
was created in Google Scholar. All articles 
authored or co-authored by the founders were 
added to their respective profiles. After adding 
all articles, each Google Scholar My citations-
profile displayed a bar graph with year on the x-
axis and the number of citations received that 
year on the y-axis. For all founders in the firm, 
all citations up to and including the second year 
of operations were summed together to a total 
citation count. 
Degree of Heterogeneity in Founding Team 
(H2) 
Following literature on managerial work 
behavior and key managerial experiences, 
backgrounds and skills needed for high 
performance (Katz, 1974; Kotter, 1982; Whitley, 
1989; Hambrick et al., 1996) we focus on 
common tier 1 positions as well as educational 
backgrounds and work experiences highlighted 
as important for performance in USO literature. 
Founding team heterogeneity is followingly 
defined in terms of educational backgrounds and 
work experiences from the industry (Roberts, 
1991; Rothaermel et al., 2007; Shane and Stuart, 
2002), technical experience (Di Gregorio and 
Shane, 2003; Zucker et al., 1998; Knockaert et 
al., 2011), managerial experience (Szilagyi and 
Schweiger, 1984), entrepreneurial experience 
(Criaco et al., 2013; Brüderl et al., 1992), 
financial experience and marketing experience. 
A common measure of experience in existing 
streams of research is to use the number of years 
of experience the founders have in the field of 
interest. However, data limitations prohibited us 
from attaining such detailed information. Instead 
we follow Shane and Stuart (2002) and Miloud 
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et al. (2012), and use dummy variables. 
Technological experience is coded 1 if any of the 
founders have educational backgrounds or work 
experience related to the technology of the 
company. Industry experience, marketing 
experience and finance experience are coded 1 if 
any of the founders have work experience or an 
educational background in marketing or 
finances, respectively. Top management 
experience is coded 1 if any of the founders have 
previously held a position in the top two tiers of 
an organization (Roure and Keeley, 1990; 
Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001). That includes 
positions such as CEO, CFO, CTO, President or 
Senior Vice President etc. Finally, startup 
experience is coded 1 if any of the founders have 
previously started a company. Because we have 
no theoretical foundation to argue the relative 
importance of each experience, we make the 
assumption that they are equally important, and 
define the degree of heterogeneity as the sum of 
the dummy variables. To conduct the coding, 
information about founders educational 
backgrounds and work experiences was first 
retrieved from the company's business plans. 
Missing information was subsequently collected 
from LinkedIn. 
Ties to The Parent University (H3a) 
There is no single and perfect way to measure 
the strength of a tie, however, a common and 
simple proxy for the strength of a social tie is the 
number of interactions between two people in a 
given amount of time (Nelson, 1989). 
Granovetter (1973) expands on this and defines 
the strength of an interpersonal tie as the linear 
combination between the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy and the 
reciprocal services that characterize each tie. 
Because such detailed information about the ties 
between the venture and its parent organization 
is unavailable to us, we instead use the total 
number of years the founders have spent at the 
parent university as a crude proxy. That includes 
time spent as employee, researcher or PHD-
candidate. The rationale being that the longer 
history a founder has with the parent university, 
the stronger the founders network is likely to be, 
and the more the founder is able to draw upon 
the university's resources.  
Quality of Parent University (H3b) 
Following Di Gregorio and Shane (2003), who 
proxy university eminence through its ranking 
published in the Gourman Reports, we proxy the 
quality of the university through its world 
ranking published by Webometrics6, the largest 
academic ranking of Higher Education 
Institutions with regards to number of 
institutions, and the only ranking that covered all 
the universities in our sample. Webometrics uses 
link analysis based on a composite indicator that 
weighs the volume (number of files and pages) 
of web content, and the impact and visibility of 
the university's publications in terms of external 
site citations, to evaluate university quality. A 
low rank indicates high quality, and to avoid 
reversed signs in our model, we inverted the rank 
through the following transformation: 1000/X 
(1000 instead of 1 is used in the numerator to 
avoid small fractions being rounded to 0). 
Early-Stage Investor Capital (H4) 
Using the data available we were able to identify 
firms that have received investor capital, 
however we were only able retrieve the actual 
investment amounts in 7 of the firms in our 
sample. Instead of using the actual amount we 
therefore use the crude proxy of a dummy 
variable that is coded 1 if the company has 
received investor capital during the first two 
years. 
Number of Patents (H5) 
Calculated as the total number of patents filed or 
published during or prior to the first two years of 
operations where the USO is listed as assignee. 
To identify relevant patents, business plans were 
first reviewed for each company. Thereafter, a 
search on the company name, as well as the 
inventors, was conducted using Googles patent 
search engine. Only patents that were filed or 
published during or prior to the second year of 
the firm’s operations, and where the firm itself 
was listed as assignee, were included in our 
results. 
Control Variables 
There are numerous factors, other than those of 
primary interest, that can affect the valuation of a 
company, leading to inflation in the error 
variance in our model (Mullen et al., 2009). To 
control for these factors, and reduce this error, 
we incorporate control variables. In addition, 
every independent variable in the model acts as a 
control for the other variables.  
                                                        
6 http://www.webometrics.info/en/Europe/Norway - an 
initiative by the Cybermetrics lab belonging to the 
Consejo Superior de investigaciones Cientificas, the 
largest public research body in Spain. 
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Previous research has highlighted several factors 
that influence valuation. For example, Gompers 
and Lerner (1999) find a strong correlation 
between capital infusion into the public market, 
measured by public stock market indexes, and 
valuations in the venture capital market. Market 
size and industry profitability and return on 
investment are also highlighted. At the firm-
level, the development stage, firm age, and type 
of industry in which the firm is situated have 
traditionally been controlled for. However, a rule 
of thumb in regression is to have at least 10 data 
cases per variable (Field, 2013). As further 
discussed in the limitations section, with our 
small sample we are already at the threshold of 
this value. Therefore, we need to limit the 
number of control variables in our model. We 
omit using the OSEBX stock index to control for 
capital infusion in the public market as our 
valuations are in 95% of the cases conducted in 
the same year (2013, which is the year of the 
most recent annual report available for still 
operating companies), and the variable would 
therefore not account for any significant variance 
in the model. It is reasonable to believe that 
USOs that target large markets, ceteris paribus, 
also receive higher valuations because of the 
larger income potential. We therefore include 
market size as a control variable at the market-
level. Market size is based on the size of the 
industry in MUSD in which the company was 
placed during the valuation process, and is 
retrieved from Ychart7. Lastly we include firm 
age, which is calculated as the difference 
between the year of the last available annual 
report, year of failure or year of acquisition, and 
year of founding. 
Model Estimation and Robustness 
To summarize the previous discussion, table 2 
presents the variables in our model. 
                                                        
7 Ycharts.com is an online provider of financial data. 
 
Table 2. Variable definitions and measurements 
Although only normality of residuals is required 
in regression, normally distributed variables are 
more likely to produce normally distributed 
residuals. We therefore checked all the 
continuous variables for normality, first by 
conducting a Shapiro-Wilk W-test, and if it was 
significant, we reviewed the deviation from 
normality by assessing the skewness and kurtosis 
of the distribution. All variables showed 
significant deviations from normality. Four of 
the variables showing the largest deviations, 
including the dependent variable, were 
transformed to reduce the skewness and kurtosis 
of their distributions. After trial and error, 
‘Company value’, ‘Degree of Heterogeneity’ and 
‘Inventor renownedness’ was LN-transformed, 
whilst ‘Number of patents’ was transformed 
using [1-1/(1+Number of patents)]. All the 
variables still showed a significant deviation 
from normality after the transformation when 
assessed using the Shapiro-Wilk W-test. 
However, a review of the variables skewness and 
kurtosis revealed a significant reduction in both 
measures for all transformed variables. The 
following equation represents the model to be 
estimated and analyzed: 
Variable Sign Measurement
Company(value Dependent EV/EBITDA,(EV/Sales(or(Price/Sales(multiples
Inventor(on(founding(team +
Dummy(variable(with(‘1’(indicating(the(
technology(inventor(being(on(the(founding(
team
Inventor(renownedness +
Total(number(of(citations(on(any(article(
authored(or(coGauthored(by(the(founders(as(
calculated(by(Google(Scholar.(
Team(heterogeneity +
Sum(of(dummy(variables(indicating(different(
backgrounds(and(experiences(in(the(founding(
team
Ties(to(parent(university +
Total(number(of(years(the(founders(have(
worked/researched(at(the(parent(university
Parent(university(quality + The(university's(world(ranking(by(Webometrics
Investor(capital +
Dummy(variable(with(‘1’(indicating(received(
investor(capital(during(or(prior(to(the(first(two(
years(of(operations
Number(of(patents +
Total(number(of(patents(published(or(filed(
during(or(prior(to(the(first(two(years(of(
Control2Variables
Company(age
Year(of(last(annual(report,(year(of(failure(or(
year(of(acquisition,(minus(year(of(founding.
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Here, α represents the intercept term, β1 - β7 are 
the coefficients of the independent variables, and 
β8 and β9 the coefficients of the control 
variables. Prior to conducting the analysis, 
variables where controlled for data entry errors, 
and the few single missing values were, 
following Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), 
replaced with the variable mean. To control for 
outliers and cases with undue influence on the 
model we calculated Cook’s Distance, which 
measures the overall influence of a case on the 
model, and the DFBetas, which looks at the 
difference between a parameter estimated using 
all cases, and estimated when one case is 
excluded. A Cook’s distance greater than 1 
(Cook and Weisberg, 1982), or a DFBeta greater 
than 2 (Stevens, 2012) indicates a case with 
undue influence on the model. All Cook’s 
distances were well below 1 (highest was 0.176), 
and the largest DFBeta was 0.86. This indicates 
no outliers or cases with undue influence in our 
model. To assure independence of residuals, or 
lack of autocorrelation, we used the Durbin-
Watson statistic which tests for serial 
correlations between residuals. In a model with 9 
regressors and 65 cases8, a lower bound for the 
statistic is 1.301 and an upper bound 1.923, at 5-
percent significance (Durbin and Watson, 1951). 
With a value of 1.837 in our model there are no 
indications of autocorrelation. Inspection of 
residual plots revealed a random array of evenly 
dispersed dots around zero which indicates that 
the variance of the residual terms are constant, 
and that there is no problem with 
heteroscedasticity. Finally, to check the 
assumption of normally distributed errors, we 
                                                        
8 
https://www3.nd.edu/~wevans1/econ30331/Durbin_Wats
on_tables.pdf 
did a Shapiro-Wilk-test on the standardized 
residuals which was non-significant (p = 0.395). 
Methodological Limitations 
There are several limitations to the methodology 
employed in this study, where the measurement 
of the dependent variable as well as the sample 
size are the most crucial. 
The dependent variable is measured firsthand 
through the use of valuation multiples, and the 
value estimations are followingly limited by the 
availability of information and the shortcomings 
of relative valuation when applied on young 
ventures. First, we have ourselves valued the 
companies based on the limited information we 
had available. This may have led to other 
valuations than what more informed analysts 
would have estimated. Second, the fundamental 
argument underlying relative valuation is that 
similar assets should be priced equally (Liu et 
al., 2002). The validity of our valuation estimates 
therefore rest on the similarity between the 
private firm being valued and the industry from 
which the multiple is derived. USOs are in many 
cases firms commercializing unique technologies 
(Shane, 2004) whose comparability to other 
firms in the same industry may be limited (Mirza 
and Rønning, 2015). Further on, factors affecting 
value are likely to be different for private and 
public firms, so public multiples are not directly 
transferrable to a private company. Third, the 
industry multiples used are crude, and in some 
cases it is difficult to place a firm in the right 
industry, again because of the unique 
technologies these firms are founded on. 
Optimally, the industry classifications used 
would have been more fine grained to easier 
separate firms into different industries. Fourth, 
the value of the firms are calculated at a specific 
point in time, at which point the firm may or 
may not have reached its full commercial 
potential in terms of revenues. The potential 
future growth in revenues and earnings a firm 
might experience is followingly not incorporated 
into our value estimates. The dependent variable 
also limits the model's generalizability as it is 
constrained in its measurements, i.e. the value of 
a company can theoretically speaking be 
unlimited, whilst the cases in our sample only 
cover a specific interval.  
The use of relative valuation was despite the 
limitations necessary to conduct this study, and 
we have to our best ability addressed these 
issues. Instead of using multiples from a single 
firm we have opted to use industry multiples to 
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average out the error that would be obtained in 
using a single firm in the chosen industry, and 
also added an illiquidity discount to account for 
the effect of using a public multiple on a private 
firm. Further on, to cross check that the right 
industry was chosen, other companies in the 
same industry were reviewed to verify that they 
delivered the same type of products or services. 
We have also excluded firms from our sample 
that have not completed their first commercial 
sale to ensure that the firm has revenues from 
their core activities. In any case, valuing a 
company is an inherently difficult and subjective 
task, and although there are severe limitations to 
the absolute measurement of our dependent 
variable, the methodological limitations are 
likely to inflict constant valuation errors across 
the firms in the sample, and the relative value of 
each firm should followingly be valid for the 
purposes of this study. 
The second limitation relates to the small sample 
size. Field (2013) writes that assuming a 5% 
significance level and the recommended power 
of a test of 0.8, 783 participants are necessary to 
detect a small effect size (Pearson correlation = 
0.1), 85 participants to detect a medium effect 
size (Pearson correlation = 0.3) and 28 
participants to detect a large effect size (Pearson 
correlation = 0.5). With 63 participants in our 
sample we are unlikely to detect small and 
medium-sized effects. The sample size is 
however limited by the availability of data, and 
although the sample is small, it does cover the 
majority of USOs in Norway established in the 
period 2000-2005, and should be representative 
of the Norwegian population of USOs. However, 
because the sample is confined to Norwegian 
USOs, the model's generalizability across 
geographies is limited.  
Another important limitation in the overall 
methodology is the lack of a longitudinal 
approach, i.e. we do not assess how the variables 
in question develop over time, but rather assume 
that the value the USO achieves is due to the 
presence of initial resource endowments. This is 
however necessary as we are interested in the 
explanatory power of these resources ex ante on 
the future value of the firm.  
As for the independent variables, they are 
measured through proxies. Per definition, a 
proxy only infers the value of the actual variable 
of interest, and its fit to be used as a proxy is 
given by the correlation between the two. We 
have, as far as the available data has allowed us, 
used proxies that are verified in previous 
research, or anchored in theory. The proxies are 
followingly believed to be a good fit to the 
variable of interest, however, without estimating 
the actual correlations, there is risk of poor 
proxies resulting in invalid and biased results. 
Finally, the methodology is limited by the 
reliability of the information sources used. The 
business plans and annual reports are considered 
more reliable than online sources such as 
LinkedIn and Google, nonetheless, to retrieve the 
information needed to conduct a study of this 
magnitude, a 360 degree approach to gathering 
data from all available sources was deemed 
necessary. 
Results 
In the following section we present descriptives 
followed by an inferential discussion on the 
hypotheses in question. 
Descriptives 
Table 3. Descriptives of the variables in the analysis. See 
appendix 7 for descriptives of the untransformed 
variables 
Our sample consists of 63 firms. Table 3 shows 
means, minimum and maximum values for all 
variables, as well as the standard deviations. 37 
of the firms were categorized as unsuccessful 
and given a value of zero, four firms were 
acquired, with an average valuation of 162 
MNOK, whilst 22 firms were categorized as still 
operating with a mean value of 59 MNOK. The 
mean value across all categories was 
approximately 31 MNOK, and the average 
company age at the time of valuation was 8.37 
years. The relatively high standard deviation of 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std.1Deviation
Company(value((transformed) 6,884 0,000 20,040 8,360
Human1Resources
Inventor(on(founding(team((binary) 0,890 0,000 1,000 0,317
Inventor(renownedness((transformed) 4,234 0,000 9,720 3,193
Team(heterogeneity((transformed) 1,057 0,000 1,950 0,411
Social1Resources
Ties(to(parent(university((years) 17,400 0,000 54,000 13,710
Parent(university(quality((transformed) 5,990 0,150 14,710 4,867
Financial1Resources
Investor(capital((binary) 0,210 0,000 1,000 0,408
Technological1Resources
Number(of(patents((transformed) 0,270 0,000 0,990 0,391
Control1Variables
Company(age((years) 8,370 1,000 13,000 3,456
Market(size((MUSD) 429(837 25(081 1(415(745 368(828
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company age (~3,5) indicates that there is a wide 
spread in how long the companies have been 
operating which underpins the need to include 
age as a control variable. The average firm 
values in each of the outcome categories are as 
expected, i.e. that firms that are acquired are on 
average valued higher than firms that are still 
operating, which are valued higher than firms 
that have shut down. 
The majority of the founding teams had an 
inventor present (0.89), the founders were on 
average cited 1219 times, and the degree of 
heterogeneity was 2.13 out of 6. The latter 
meaning that on average, firms had founding 
teams with backgrounds and experiences from 2 
out of the 6 fields considered in this study. 
Moreover, founding teams had an average of 
17.40 years of working experience from the 
parent university. Under 25% (0.21) of the firms 
in the sample received investor capital during or 
prior to the first two years of operations, and the 
mean number of patents filed and published was 
3.4 per firm.  
Inferential  
Table 4 reports the bivariate Pearson correlations 
between the variables in our model, ordered by 
resource category.  
As can be seen, all correlations between the 
dependent variable ‘Company value’ and the 
independent variables are in the predicted 
direction, and consistent with the developed 
hypotheses. Seven out of nine correlations are 
significant. The only independent variable with 
an insignificant correlation to ‘Company value’ 
is ‘Investor capital’. The table also shows that 
there are significant correlations between 
independent variables, however this does not 
necessarily indicate multicollinearity-problems 
in the model. A Pearson correlation greater than 
0.8 between two variables indicates problems of 
collinearity (Field, 2013), and a variance 
inflation factor (VIF) greater than 10 should 
raise concerns (Bowerman and O'Connell, 1990). 
Further on, if the average VIF is substantially 
greater than 1, then the regression may be biased 
(Bowerman and O'Connell, 1990). The largest 
Pearson correlation between any two variables is 
0.357, between ‘Inventor renownedness’ and 
‘Ties to parent’. This is somewhat expected as 
the longer founders have worked/researched at 
the university, the more papers they are likely to 
have published and followingly be cited on. The 
highest VIF was 1.483, with an average VIF of 
1.260. Despite significant correlations between 
independent variables, both the magnitudes of 
the correlations and the VIF confirm that 
collinearity is not a problem in our model.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Company(value((transformed)([1] 1
Human0Resources
Inventor(on(founding(team([2] 0,2* 1
Inventor(renownedness((transformed)([3] 0,25** 0,299*** 1
Team(heterogeneity((transformed)([4] 0,284** 0,251** 0,144 1
Social0Resources
Ties(to(parent(university([5] 0,401**** 0,229** 0,393**** 0,224** 1
Parent(university(quality((transformed)([6] 0,332*** I0,089 0,186* 0,098 0,246** 1
Financial0Resources
Investor(capital([7] 0,097 0,18* 0,111 0,182* 0,054 I0,036 1
Technological0Resources
Number(of(patents((transformed)([8] 0,391**** 0,047 0,328*** I0,109 0,333*** 0,038 0,079 1
Control0Variables
Company(age([9] 0,494**** 0,185* 0,182* 0,123 0,168* 0,18* 0,335*** 0,323*** 1
Market(size((MUSD)([10] 0,025 I0,155 0,166* I0,08 0,27** 0,324*** I0,001 0,111 I0,027 1
Table 4. Pearson Correlation Matrix - Correlation significant at: * p < 0,1, ** p < ,05, *** p < ,01, **** p < ,001 
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In the following we review pure relationships 
between the independent variables in our four 
resource categories and the dependent variable 
represented by the three outcome categories. It is 
here assumed, as was shown above, that firms 
that are categorized as acquired are on average 
valued higher than firms that are still operating, 
which again are valued higher than firms that are 
unsuccessful. It is important to note that the 
below inferentials are only indicative of what 
results may be expected from the regression 
analysis. The graphs represent averages, and may 
obscure the real relationship between the two 
variables of interest. Further on, relationships 
between the different independent variables are 
not controlled for.  
Figure 3 shows the mean values by outcome 
category for the human capital resources 
‘Inventor on team’, ‘Degree of heterogeneity’ 
and ‘Inventor renownedness’. The graph shows a 
positive relationship between the two former 
variables and firm value, i.e. firm value is 
increasing with increasing degree of 
heterogeneity and inventors on the team, which 
indicates support for hypothesis 1a and 2. There 
does not seem to be a linear relationship between 
the latter variable and firm value, which 
indicates that hypothesis 1b may not be 
supported. This will be further examined in the 
next section. 
 
Figure 3. Mean values for human resources 
Figure 4 shows the mean values by outcome 
category for the social resources in our study. As 
can be seen, both the variables ‘Ties to parent’ 
and ‘Parent ranking’ are increasing in firm value, 
which indicates support for hypothesis 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 4. Mean values for social resources 
Figure 5 shows the mean value by outcome 
category for the financial resource in our study. 
The graph indicates a positive relationship 
between firm value and attained investor capital, 
where nearly 20% of unsuccessful firms, nearly 
23% of still operating firms, and 25% of all 
acquired firms received investor capital. 
Although indicative, this underpins hypothesis 5. 
 
Figure 5. Mean value for financial resources (investor 
capital) 
Finally, figure 6 shows the mean value by 
outcome category for the technical resource in 
our study, i.e. patents. The graph does not 
indicate a linear relationship between patents and 
firm value, which indicates that hypothesis 6 
may not be supported. 
 
Figure 6. Mean value for technological resources 
(number of patents) 
As mentioned, the above inferentials do not 
control for the effect different independent 
variables assert on each other. Table 5 presents 
the complete regression model. 
Discussion 
Because we are analyzing the hypotheses under 
the assumption of ceteris paribus, hypotheses 
related to each resource category are first tested 
alone in model 2 through model 5 with only 
control variables. Model 6 is the full model with 
all independent and control variables included. 
Because of lacking theory as to the relative 
importance of each independent variable, all 
variables are introduced in the full model 
simultaneously. This is in accordance with 
researchers believing that this method is the only 
appropriate method for theory testing 
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(Studenmund, 2011), because stepwise 
techniques are influenced by random variation in 
the data and so seldom give replicable results if 
the model is re-tested. Model 1 represents the 
baseline model, and includes only the control 
variables. Given the limitations previously 
mentioned, we focus our discussion on general 
relationships between initial resource-
endowments of USOs and firm value instead of 
exact coefficients and effect sizes.  
Model 1 only includes the control variables. Age 
is estimated to have a large and significant effect 
at the 0.1% level, and is consistently significant 
across all models (except the full model where it 
is significant at the 1% level). This is consistent 
with previous research, and also expected. Firms 
that have been operating longer are more likely 
to have finished developing a product and 
established distribution channels, leading to 
higher revenues, less uncertainty and higher firm 
valuations compared to younger firms. The 
significance level is though surprising 
considering our small sample size, and to verify 
the result we reviewed the coding of the variable 
to identify possible errors, but none were found. 
The authors argue that this can be seen in context 
with our model of estimating firm value, where 
as previously mentioned, the value of future 
growth is not included. Firms that are older have 
had more time to grow and increase their 
revenues, and therefore achieve higher 
valuations in our model, which is reflected in the 
high significance level of the control variable 
age. This however underpins the importance of 
including age as a control variable, as it will 
account for the variance this effect has on firm 
value. Market size is surprisingly, and in 
contradiction to existing research, found to have 
a small and insignificant effect. This may 
indicate that in the context of USOs, market 
sizes of existing industries are less important 
when valuing a new venture. USOs often 
develop novel technology (Shane, 2004), and 
this technology might unlock new application 
areas and markets, rendering market sizes of the 
industries of competitors less representative for 
the markets targeted by the USO. Another 
possible and plausible explanation is that the 
industry classifications chosen for each of the 
firms in our sample are too broad to be 
representative of their actual target markets. 
Human Resources 
In model 2 we test the hypotheses developed 
about human capital resources and their relation 
to firm value. Previous research indicates that 
human capital resources can lead to sustained 
competitive advantages (Wright et al., 1994), 
and therefore higher performance and profits. 
Especially inventor presence on the founding 
team together with the inventor’s renownedness 
and team heterogeneity are highlighted as 
positively related to USO performance (Clarysse 
and Bruneel, 2007; Markman et al., 2008; 
Wright et al., 1994; Hess and Rothaermel, 2012; 
Zucker et al., 2002; Knockaert et al., 2010). This 
led us to respectively develop hypotheses 1a, 
hypothesis 1b and hypothesis 2.  
Variable Model+1 Model+2 Model+3 Model+4 Model+5 Model+6
Human+Resources
Inventor(on(founding(team 0,036 0,067
Inventor(renownedness((transformed) 0,123 ;0,037
Team(heterogeneity((transformed) 0,206* 0,204*
Social+Resources
Ties(to(parent(university 0,312*** 0,182
Parent(university(quality((transformed) 0,222* 0,236**
Financial+Resources
Investor(capital ;0,077 ;0,08
Technological+Resources
Number(of(patents((transformed) 0,257** 0,262**
Control+Variables
Company(age 0,495**** 0,440**** 0,398**** 0,521**** 0,411**** 0,330***
Market(size((MUSD) 0,039 0,039 ;0,120 0,039 0,008 ;0,088
Constant ;3,503 ;9,064** ;5,593 ;3,706 ;2,986 ;10,008***
N((number(of(observations) 63 63 63 63 63 63
Adjusted(R2 0,22 0,255 0,35 0,212 0,268 0,378
Table 5. Regression model - Coefficient significant at: * p < 0,1, ** p < ,05, *** p < ,01, **** p < ,001 
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In hypothesis 1a we proposed that USOs that 
have the technology inventors on the founding 
team achieve higher valuations in the long term. 
In both models 2 and 6, the estimated regression 
coefficient is positive as proposed, however it is 
small and insignificant, leading to hypothesis 1a 
not being supported. The authors propose that 
the insignificant results might be due to an 
unfitting operationalization of the inventors 
presence in the founding team, and not the fact 
that the engagement of the technology inventor 
in a USO is not important for the company's 
success, and subsequently firm value. In our 
sample, almost 90% of the firms had at least one 
of the technology inventors in their founding 
teams. It is this large percentage rate that makes 
it difficult to use the binary operationalization of 
inventor presence to differentiate between USOs 
future firm values, because there simply is not 
enough variance in the sample. Further on, being 
named inventor in a business plan and receiving 
equity in the new venture does not to a satisfying 
degree represent the different levels an inventor 
can be engaged in the venture. The effect of the 
inventors presence on venture performance, and 
subsequent firm value, is likely to be moderated 
by other factors such as how much effort and 
time the inventor dedicates to the startup. The 
technology inventor may solely be given an 
equity stake in the company as a compensation 
for the right to use the intellectual property for 
commercialization purposes. The new venture 
can not, to a high degree, exploit the tacit 
knowledge kept by the inventor if the inventor 
does not really commit herself to the work of 
bringing the new product to market. Blair and 
Hitchens (1998) find that presence of a full-time 
entrepreneur enhances the performance of USOs 
due to signaling effects as well as being able to 
focus solely on the new venture. The same 
arguments can be applied to the technology 
inventor in the founding team. We followingly 
conclude that the binary operationalization of 
inventor participation in the USO founding team 
is not suited as a predictor for firm value, and 
consequently as a heuristic in a resource-based 
valuation framework, but still argue the 
importance of inventors in founding teams due to 
the tacit knowledge she holds about the 
underlying technology on which the new venture 
is founded. Parts of this tacit knowledge is likely 
to be difficult to make explicit, and for that 
reason, the inventor is a non-substitutable asset. 
Not only is the successes of the inventors 
research interesting for the new venture, but the 
vast amount of knowledge the inventor has 
gained through failed experiments is likely to be 
valuable when further developing the 
technology. Further on, significant technological 
modifications and developments are likely 
necessary to bring the early-stage technologies 
these companies are founded on to commercial 
applications, which the technology inventor is 
likely to be best suited to accomplish. Proxies 
employed in future research should therefore to a 
better degree measure the actual contribution of 
the inventor, instead of simply her presence. 
In hypothesis 1b we proposed that USOs who 
have more renowned inventors should achieve 
higher firm valuations, and proxied how 
renowned an inventor is through her citation rate. 
Both models 2 and 6 estimate a small, 
insignificant regression coefficient for the effect 
of how renowned the inventor is on firm value, 
and the coefficient is slightly negative in the full 
model. The coefficient itself is highly uncertain 
with a large standard error and 95% confidence 
interval between -0.716 and 0.520. Hypothesis 
1b is followingly not supported. The underlying 
argument for the hypothesis was the signaling 
effect a renowned inventor can have on external 
resource holders. A possible explanation for the 
small and insignificant regression coefficient is 
the conflict of interest between research, and 
commercializing the technology that might arise 
for an inventor. Inventors that have high citation 
counts are likely to be avid researchers with a 
focus on publishing their results for the sake of 
research, not commercialization. The shift in 
mindset needed to go from a research-setting to 
commercialization-setting is followingly likely 
to be more difficult for more renowned investors, 
which may affect the performance of the new 
venture, and subsequently firm valuation. This is 
likely to be a larger issue for researchers that 
have been more active, and published more 
papers. In any case, we do not find support for 
including the renownedness of an inventor, 
proxied through her citation count, as a predictor 
of USO firm value. 
In hypothesis 2 we proposed that founding teams 
that are more heterogeneous in terms of 
educational backgrounds and previous work 
experiences should achieve higher valuations. 
The hypothesis is supported in both model 2 and 
model 6 at the 10% level. This is in accordance 
with previous research. Visintin and Pittino 
(2014) find that USOs with founding teams that 
have backgrounds from both business and 
engineering experience higher sales growths, and 
Knockaert et al. (2011) state that these 
companies receive higher share valuations. 
Having both technical and business knowledge is 
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likely to be important in any startup, however, 
the authors argue that because of the high 
uncertainty associated with early-stage USOs, 
and because of the challenges they face in terms 
of attracting funding and identifying an 
application and target market for the technology, 
the combined efforts on both the technological 
and business front are likely to be more vital 
than in the average startup. For example, the 
long development times (Rasmussen et al., 2013) 
are likely to require a greater degree of 
synchronization between the development plan 
and financial plan to assure enough funding 
throughout the development process. The 
general-purpose nature of the technologies 
(Nelsen, 1991; del Campo et al., 1999) require a 
larger degree of cooperation between business 
people and technical people to assure that the 
technology is developed towards applications 
that provide the largest benefits to the customer 
as well as the largest markets. Further on, the 
early-stage nature  of the technologies (Shane, 
2004) to a greater degree are likely to require 
these companies to attract partners, be that 
financial or industrial, and business acumen in 
the top management team is therefore as 
important as technical knowledge. In conclusion, 
our results indicate heterogeneity in the founding 
team of a USO as a valid predictor for firm 
value, and that it therefore should be included as 
a heuristic in a resource-based valuation 
framework. 
Social Resources 
Model 3 tests hypotheses developed about the 
relationship between initial social resource-
endowments in a USO and firm value. Social 
resources refer to the personal networks of the 
founding team, and in the performance literature 
on USOs, the degree of university affiliation has 
been highlighted as correlated with performance, 
as has the quality of the university itself. 
In hypothesis 3a we proposed that USOs with 
stronger ties to the parent university in their early 
stages should be valued higher than those with 
weaker ties. The strength of the tie is proxied 
through the total number of years the founders 
have worked/researched at the parent university. 
The hypothesis is supported in model 3 at the 1% 
level, but looses its significance in the full 
model. The loss of significance can be attributed 
to the correlation between ‘Ties to parent’ and 
‘Inventor renownedness’, and the variable does 
indeed keep its significance when the full model 
is estimated without ‘Inventor renownedness’ 
being included. The high correlation between 
these two variables is natural as founders who 
have worked/researched longer at the university 
are likely to have published more papers and 
received more citations. This correlation might 
have been reduced if another proxy for ‘Ties to 
parent’ was used. (Granovetter, 1973) defines the 
strength of a tie as the combination between the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the 
intimacy, and the reciprocal services that 
characterize each tie, and by only using the time 
aspect of this definition, we might not represent 
the strength of the tie adequately. A second 
reason for the loss of significance may be due to 
the small sample size. As (Field, 2013) points 
out, small or medium sized effects will not be 
significant in our model.  
Based on the above discussion, we can not 
advocate that the strength of ties between a USO 
and the parent university, proxied through the 
number of years the founders have worked/done 
research at the parent, is suited as a heuristic in a 
resource-based valuation framework, but we do 
attain our belief that this specific resource can 
positively affect the performance of an USO, and 
encourage the search of a more fitting proxy for 
the relationship. Seen from a resource-based 
perspective, a strong affiliation between the USO 
and its parent university can be valuable because 
the parent can provide access to resources such 
as talent and critical financial resources 
(Bigliardi et al., 2013), knowledge and 
complementary R&D (Lubik et al., 2013), labs 
and expensive equipment at low cost (Starr and 
MacMillan, 1990; Roberts and Malonet, 1996). 
Further on, the university has a limited set of 
resources, and the authors argue that the stronger 
the social ties between the founders and the 
parent, the more likely the USO is to receive a 
larger share of these resources because the 
founders can draw upon their network. The 
affiliation is likely to be rare due to the 
university only supporting USOs that originate 
within its own walls. Inimitability is likely due to 
the relationship between the university and the 
new venture being built over time and being path 
dependent (Zander and Zander, 2005; Santala 
and Parvinen, 2007), i.e. the relationship is built 
through the work the technology inventor 
conducted at the university and through the 
inventors interactions with other people at the 
university during her time there. Finally, the 
relationship between the parent university and 
the USO is non-substitutable due to each 
university’s uniqueness in terms of quality and 
expertise. Future research should therefore seek 
to develop better proxies to the strength of social 
ties between a USO and its parent to test if this 
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variable is suited as a heuristic in a resource-
based valuation framework. 
In hypothesis 3b we proposed that USOs 
originating from more renowned, higher quality 
universities, should achieve higher valuations, 
and proxied the quality of the university through 
its world rank. The hypothesis is supported in 
both model 3 and the full model at the 10% and 
5% level respectively. Existing streams of 
research highlight access to expert knowledge, 
people (Powers and McDougall, 2005), and 
funding (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003) as three 
reasons for why the quality of the university 
affects USO performance. The authors further 
argue that higher quality universities are likely to 
produce higher quality research, and followingly 
better technology on which USOs can be 
founded. Because most of these companies are 
solely founded around a technology, the quality 
of the technology is obviously important to firm 
performance, and subsequently firm value. 
Higher quality universities are also likely to have 
stronger signaling effects towards external 
resource holders. These signaling effects can be 
particularly valuable for early stage USOs 
because of no objective operating data, and 
consequently investors not being able to 
adequately assess the technology on which the 
new venture is founded (Wright et al., 2006). 
Our analysis followingly indicates that the 
quality of the university should indeed be 
included as a heuristic in a resource-based 
valuation framework. 
Financial Resources 
In model 4 we test hypothesis 4, where we 
propose that USOs who receive investor capital 
in their early-stages, proxied as a binary variable, 
should achieve higher valuations than those that 
do not. Financial resources are for obvious 
reasons important for all early stage ventures, 
however, as highlighted in the literature review, 
it is especially critical for early stage USOs due 
to the large development costs they face. 
Surprisingly the regression coefficient is 
negative and insignificant in both model 4 and 
the full model, and we do not find support for 
hypothesis 4.  
Although surprising, the result is consistent with 
the previous discussion on financial resources 
not on their own being valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-substitutable (VRIN), and should 
therefore not lead to sustained competitive 
advantages, and followingly higher profits and 
higher value. Instead, capital enables firms to 
acquire other resources that can be VRIN. In 
agreement with this, our results indicate that the 
binary operationalization of received investor 
capital in the early-stages of a USOs life-cycle is 
not a good predictor for the future value of the 
firm, which has important implications. Previous 
research has focused on the relationship between 
investor capital and performance, and has found 
that there is a positive significant relationship 
between the two. However, performance has 
commonly been measured through sales growth 
(e.g. Walter et al. (2006), Lubik et al. (2013) and 
Bigliardi et al. (2013)), firm outcome, i.e. if the 
firm achieved IPO, got acquired, survived or 
failed (e.g. Criaco et al. (2013) and Fuller and 
Rothaermel (2012)), or number of employees 
and employment growth (e.g. Sternberg (2014), 
Bigliardi et al. (2013), Zerbinati et al. (2012), 
Zhang (2009) and Walter et al. (2006)). Some of 
these measures have obvious positive 
relationships to a firm attaining investor capital. 
For example, investor capital enables a company 
to hire more employees which obviously lead to 
employee growth, it may boost sales through 
marketing, or it may keep the company operating 
longer despite large losses. Our study, which 
instead of indirect performance measures relates 
‘Investor capital’ in an early-stage to actual firm 
value, shows that even though capital may 
increase firm performance on certain measures 
used by other researchers, it does not necessarily 
increase firm value. In fact, we find a negative 
relationship between the two (although the 
relationship is insignificant).  
There are multiple reasons for why early-stage 
investments may negatively impact the 
performance, and subsequently value, of USOs. 
First of all, investors are generally interested in 
the largest return possible and, considering the 
time value of money, at the earliest possible time 
after investing. Early-stage USOs on the other 
hand have long development times (Rasmussen 
et al., 2013; Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006). This 
interest gap may lead to pressure from the 
investors on the company to speed up 
development, take shortcuts where possible, 
make rash decisions, and followingly harm the 
new venture's performance and value. Another 
possible reason for the negative relationship is 
the competence and knowledge gap between 
investors and founders in USOs. In research on 
the effect of venture capital it has been 
highlighted that venture capitalists contribute 
with more than simply money. Their networks, 
experience and advice are almost equally, if not 
more, important in helping the new venture 
succeed (Hellman and Puri, 2000; Sapienza, 
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1992). Many USOs on the other hand are 
working with complex technology that investors 
may have problems understanding (Shane, 
2004). This can make it difficult for the investors 
to contribute with this added value, and may 
ultimately lead them to give bad advice. 
On the other hand, there can be simple 
methodological explanations to our results. Our 
binary operationalization is crude, and does not 
incorporate the actual amount received, or who 
the investor is. These two variables are likely to 
have strong moderating effects on the investment 
variable. Although our results are surprising, the 
authors find them plausible. The analysis 
indicates that investor capital, proxied through a 
binary variable, is not a good predictor for early-
stage USO firm value, and therefore should not 
be included as a heuristic in a resource-based 
valuation framework. 
Technological Resources 
The last category of technological resources are 
particularly important for early stage USOs, as 
they are founded to commercialize distinct 
technological innovations developed at the 
parent university (O’Shea et al., 2008). In model 
5 we test hypothesis 5, where we propose that 
USOs who publish or file more patents during 
their early stages achieve higher valuations. The 
hypothesis is supported in both model 5 and the 
full model at the 5% level. 
The authors argue that patents are positively 
related to USO value because they are a resource 
that, in accordance with Mirza and Rønning 
(2015), can be valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable, and followingly result in a 
sustained competitive advantage, at least for the 
duration of the patents validity. The reviewed 
literature has shown that the patents of the new 
venture are likely to be valuable (Deeds et al., 
2000; Zahra and Bogner, 2000; Powers and 
McDougall, 2005). The patents protect the new 
venture from competitors, as well as it is natural 
to believe that the new venture would not have 
been founded if the founders did not believe that 
the underlying technology, protected by the 
patents, would yield a positive and significant 
financial return. Further on, the larger the scope 
and number of patents, the greater is the 
likelihood of protecting several application areas, 
which in the future can lead to licensing incomes 
from others who wish to utilize the patents, or a 
protected technology in multiple markets, which 
naturally is valuable. For obvious reasons, and 
per definition, the patents are likely to be rare 
and inimitable (Markman et al., 2004). As for the 
patents non-substitutability, Markman et al. 
(2004) operationalize non-substitutability as the 
patents number of claims, with the rationale 
being that claims define the scope of an 
invention and distinguish its property from the 
surrounding technological territory, and once a 
technology space is protected by a patent, 
substitution becomes difficult and costly. Our 
analysis confirms the positive relationship 
between patents and the long term value of a 
USO, and establishes a theoretical linkage 
between the two. We conclude that the number 
of patents filed or published by a USO during its 
first two years should be included as a heuristic 
in a resource-based valuation framework. 
Conclusion and Limitations 
The topic of valuation has traditionally been a 
field within corporate finance, with common 
valuation methods being dependent on future 
cash flows, assets or valuations of comparative 
firms (Seppä and Laamanen, 2001). However, as 
Mirza and Rønning (2015) point out, these 
methods are poorly suited to be used on early-
stage USOs due to a fundamental mismatch 
between the required inputs and the operating 
data available for these companies. This study 
has taken a resource-based perspective on 
valuation to develop a conceptual framework 
where resources are used as valuation inputs 
rather than financial data. The underlying 
argument being that when it is difficult to value a 
company based on outputs (cash flows etc.), a 
method based on inputs (resources, founder 
characteristics, network etc.) that can be 
objectively measured, and applied as heuristics, 
may prove more satisfactory. To empirically test 
the framework we have leveraged existing 
research on the resource-performance 
relationships in USOs. This led us to develop six 
hypotheses about the relationship between 
human capital, social, financial and 
technological resources and firm value. The 
hypotheses were tested using multiple 
hierarchical regression on a data sample of 63 
Norwegian USOs from the EntPro project 
founded in the period 2000 - 2005. Our analysis 
has shown that there is a significant positive 
relationship between the long term equity value 
of a USO and the founding teams heterogeneity, 
the quality of the parent university and the 
number of patents the new venture has filed or 
published. We did not find a significant 
relationship between firm value and inventors on 
the founding team, USOs with stronger ties to 
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the parent, or USOs who attain early-stage 
investor capital. For the latter three hypotheses 
that were not supported we have argued that this 
might be due to unrepresentative 
operationalizations, and further research is 
therefore necessary to verify our results. For the 
former three hypotheses, the authors argue that 
given the significant relationship identified, 
USOs who have more heterogeneous founding 
teams, originate from higher quality universities 
and have more filed or published patents in their 
early stages, should, ceteris paribus, be valued 
higher than those that do not. 
This is because, as resource-based theory 
suggests, resources are what ultimately drives 
value creation in firms, and our analysis 
indicates that these specific resources are 
associated with higher long term firm values. 
Given the uncertain nature of these firms, it 
makes more sense to use these resources to guide 
valuations, and distinguish between different 
investment opportunities, instead of trying to 
estimate absolute firm values with uncertain cash 
flows and discount rates. On a conceptual level, 
this is highlighted in the framework in figure 7, 
and substantiated, although tentative, through 
our empirical analysis. As such, these resource 
characteristics should be applicable to be used as 
heuristics to value a USO in its early stages 
regardless of the high fundamental uncertainty 
surrounding these firms. This is however the first 
study of its kind, and like traditional valuation 
methods weren't developed in a single study, 
neither will a resource-based valuation 
framework. We set out to prove the feasibility of 
such a framework, which the authors feel 
confident they have, but to develop a complete 
valuation framework based on resources will 
require significant attention from researchers in 
both strategic management and corporate finance 
to adequately bridge the gap between the two.  
This study has a number of implications for both 
investors, entrepreneurs and researchers. For 
investors, we have established the initial 
theoretical linkages between initial resource 
endowments and subsequent firm value, which 
can be used as heuristics when valuing an early-
stage USO. Instead of founders and investors 
estimating and forecasting cash flows that are 
impossible to reliably estimate in the early stages 
(Mirza and Rønning, 2015), and trying to justify 
uncertain growth- and discount rates where a 
small change in either can result in large changes 
in the firm value, using resources which both the 
investor and the entrepreneurs can objectively 
measure and agree upon, is likely to be a more 
effective and fair process. Although we have not 
developed a complete valuation framework, 
investors can use the conceptual framework to 
take into consideration the identified 
relationships when estimating firm values. 
Further on, we have shown that resource-
performance relationships highlighted in theory 
are not necessarily good heuristics for predicting 
the future value of a firm, such as the presence of 
an investor in the founding team or early-stage 
investor capital. Rather it is necessary to dig 
deeper into the resources to assert their effect on 
firm performance and subsequent firm value. For 
entrepreneurs, the findings highlight initial 
resources that the new venture should strive to 
assemble to increase their performance, and 
Figure 7. Conceptual framework 
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subsequently the value of their firm. We have 
shown that entrepreneurs should struggle to 
assemble complementary and heterogeneous 
founding teams to achieve higher firm 
valuations, and that asserting control over their 
technology through patents is positively related 
to firm value. Moreover, entrepreneurs licensing 
technology from universities should take into 
account the quality of the university when 
deciding on what technology to license. Finally, 
our results pave the way for an entire new stream 
of research bridging the gap between strategic 
management and traditional corporate finance. 
Further Research 
The limitations previously highlighted limit the 
generalizability of this study and underpin the 
need to verify the results obtained using larger 
samples. Future research on the topic should 
however not only increase the sample size, in 
absolute numbers as well as in geographical 
spread, but also the number of resource-value 
relationships examined. We have only been able 
to examine six of these relationships. To develop 
a complete resource-based valuation framework 
it will be necessary to significantly expand on 
this, find better and more detailed proxies which 
to a greater degree can differentiate between 
USOs, as well as examine the relative 
importance of each resource type. It is also 
necessary to investigate the moderating effect of 
firm capabilities on the relationship between 
resources and firm value, and whether it is 
possible to objectively operationalize these 
capabilities to be included in a resource-based 
valuation framework. Further on, we have not 
incorporated the possible effects of external 
factors, as highlighted by the Industrial 
organization perspective, on the value of a firm 
in our framework. Neither have we included 
variables such as estimated development times 
and capital needs which are likely to have strong 
implications on value estimations. To develop a 
complete and robust framework, such variables 
and their effects on early stage value must be 
investigated. 
Amongst our results, although statistically 
insignificant, we find the negative relationship 
between early stage investor capital and long 
term value especially interesting. This finding 
contradicts existing research on the subject, and 
researchers should try to verify this, as the 
implications of this result for entrepreneurs are 
significant. It is also important to verify our 
results using different data sources. First of all, 
valuations should be conducted by impartial 
venture capitalists. Further on, data regarding 
founder backgrounds, financing and patents 
should be collected first hand directly from the 
USO to avoid information errors. 
This study, as the first of its kind, aimed to 
establish the initial theoretical linkages between 
resources and firm value, and as such start to 
bridge the gap between traditional corporate 
finance, strategic management and USOs. There 
is significant research necessary to develop a 
complete standardized valuation framework with 
a satisfying degree of predictive power. It is 
however clear that today’s valuation methods are 
not good enough, and that a resource-based 
valuation framework has potential, so research 
efforts toward this should be prioritized.   
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Technological Forecasting and 
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Evaluating Performance of University Spin-Off Companies: Lessons from Italy 
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Journal of technology management 
& innovation 
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Value creation from the innovation environment: partnership strategies in 
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Among University 
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Economic Development Quarterly 
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The university entrepreneur: a census and survey of attributes and outcomes 
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Technology Analysis & Strategic 
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Nurture or nature? The growth paradox of research-based spin-offs 
1 GS 
Technology Analysis & Strategic 
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anagement 
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Entrepreneurial Origin, Technological Knowledge, and the Growth of Spin-Off 
Companies 
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Journal of M
anagement Studies 
Knockaert et al. (2011) 
The Relationship Between Knowledge Transfer, Top M
anagement Team 
Composition, and Performance: The Case of Science-Based Entrepreneurial Firms 
48 GS (12 ISI) 
Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 
!
3  Zhang (2009) 
The performance of university spin-offs: an exploratory analysis using venture 
capital data 
85 GS (26 ISI) 
The Journal of Technology 
Transfer 
Clarysse et al. (2007) 
Academic spin-offs, formal technology transfer and capital raising 
97 GS (34 ISI) 
Industrial and Corporate Change 
Lawton Smith and Ho (2006) 
M
easuring the performance of Oxford University, Oxford Brookes University and 
the government laboratories’ spin-off companies 
82 GS (21 ISI) 
Research Policy 
W
alter et al. (2006) 
The impact of network capabilities and entrepreneurial orientation on university 
spin-off performance 
461 GS (116 ISI) 
Journal of Business Venturing 
Powers and M
cDougall (2005) 
University start-up formation and technology licensing with firms that go public: a 
resource-based view of academic entrepreneurship 
348 GS (95 ISI) 
Journal of Business Venturing 
Shane and Stuart (2002) 
Organizational Endowments and the Performance of University Start-Ups 
975 GS (333 ISI) 
M
anagement science 
Bonardo et al. (2011) 
Valuing University
‐Based Firms: The Effects of Academic Affiliation on IPO 
Performance 
34 GS 
Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 
Colombo et al. (2010) 
Dynamics of science-based entrepreneurship 
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The Journal of Technology 
Transfer 
Djokovic and Souitaris (2008) 
Spinouts from academic institutions: a literature review with suggestions for 
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The Journal of Technology 
Transfer 
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Entrepreneurial orientation, technology transfer and spinoff performance of US 
universities 
456 GS 
Research Policy 
Zucker et al. (1998) 
Geographically localized knowledge: spillovers or markets? 
824 GS 
Economic Inquiry 
Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) 
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hy do some universities generate more start-ups than others? 
912 GS 
Research policy 
Roberts and Hauptman (1986) 
The process of technology transfer to the new biomedical and pharmaceutical firm 
40 GS (16 ISI) 
Research Policy 
Birley (1986) 
The role of networks in the entrepreneurial process 
1626 GS 
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Gurdon and Samsom (2010) 
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Technovation 
M
ustar et al. (2008) 
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54 GS 
Science and Public Policy 
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Social Capital Through Networks: The Case Of University Spin
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9 GS (6 ISI) 
Tijdschrift voor economische en 
sociale geografie 
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Rothaermel and Thursby (2005) 
Incubator firm failure or graduation?: The role of university linkages 
207 GS 
Research policy 
Agarwal and Shah (2014) 
Knowledge sources of entrepreneurship: Firm formation by academic, user and 
employee innovators 
2 GS 
Research Policy 
Ortín-Ángel and Vendrell-Herrero 
(2014) 
University spin-offs vs. other NTBFs: Total factor productivity differences at 
outset and evolution 
4 GS 
Technovation 
Festel (2013) 
Academic spin-offs, corporate spin-outs and company internal start-ups as 
technology transfer approach 
11 GS (2 ISI) 
The Journal of Technology 
Transfer 
Rothaermel et al. (2007) 
University entrepreneurship: a taxonomy of the literature 
640 GS (216 ISI) 
Industrial and corporate change 
De Coster and Butler (2005) 
Assessment of proposals for new technology ventures in the UK: characteristics of 
university spin-off companies 
78 GS (20 ISI) 
Technovation 
Vohora et al. (2004) 
Critical junctures in the development of university high-tech spinout companies 
606 GS (180 ISI) 
Research policy 
Shane (2004) 
Academic entrepreneurship: University spinoffs and wealth creation 
966 GS 
  
Ensley and Hmieleski (2005) 
A comparative study of new venture top management team composition, dynamics 
and performance between university-based and independent start-ups 
214 GS (59 ISI) 
Research Policy 
Nelsen (1991) 
The lifeblood of biotechnology: University-industry technology transfer 
33 GS 
The business of biotechnology: 
from the bench to the street 
del Campo et al. (1999) 
The transfer and commercialization of university-developed medical imaging 
technology: opportunities and problems 
28 (9 ISI) 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
M
anagement 
Landry et al. (2006) 
W
hy are some university researchers more likely to create spin-offs than others? 
Evidence from Canadian universities 
172 GS 
Research Policy 
Ortín-Ángel and Vendrell-Herrero 
(2010) 
W
hy do university spin-offs attract more venture capitalists? 
8 GS 
Venture Capital 
5Appendix 3 - Codebook
Variable Coding instructions Variable in analysis Measure
General information
Forny ID Unique ID from FORNY Database Nominal
OrgNr Organizational number of the company Nominal
Initial Name Name of the company Nominal
Comment
Comments on coding problems and method of 
valuation Nominal
Founded Year Year of founding Scale
TTO Name of TTO involved Nominal
Year T
Year of shutdown for unsuccessful firms, acquisition 
for acquired firms, or year of last annual report for 
companies still operating Ordinal
Age at T Year of founding minus year T Control variable Scale
M&A Year Year of acquisition for acquired companies. Ordinal
Valuation information
Industry(Damodaran) Industry mapping in accordance with Damodaran Nominal
Industry(Ycharts) Industry mapping in accordance with Ycharts Nominal
Value Categorical
Coded as either 'unsucessfull', 'Still operating' or  
'M&A' Nominal
Value Integer Unsuccessfull=0, Still operating=1, M&A=2 Ordinal
OSEBX 
Value of OSEBX index on Jan 1st, second year of 
operations Scale
Market Size(Ycharts) Market size of the industry from Ycharts Control Variable Scale
EV/EBITDA (Damodaran) Multiple retrived from Damodaran Scale
EV/EBITDA (Ycharts) Multiple retrived from Ycharts Scale
EV/Revenue (Damodaran) Multiple retrived from Damodaran Scale
EV/Revenue (Ycharts) Multiple retrived from Ycharts Scale
Yearly revenue between founding 
and year T
15 variables indicating yearly revenue from founding 
to year T Scale
Earnings Year T Earnings in year T retrieved from Proff Scale
EBITDA Year T EBITDA in year T retrieved from Proff Scale
Year-over-year Growth Between 
year T and founding
13 variables indicating revenue growth year-over-year 
from founding til year T Scale
Geometric Growth
Geometric growth in revenues from first year of sales 
til year T Scale
Aritmetic Growth Arithmetic growth in revenues from first year of sales til Year T Scale
Value (PEG_Damodaran)
Value of company using PEG multiple retrived from 
Damodaran Scale
6Value (PEG_Ycharts)
Value of company using PEG multiple retrived from 
Ycharts Scale
Value(EV/EBITDA_Damodaran)
Value of company using EV/EBITDA multiple 
retrived from Damodaran Scale
Value (EV/EBITDA_Ycharts)
Value of company using EV/EBITDA multiple 
retrived from Ycharts Scale
Value(EV/Sales_Damodaran)
Value of company using EV/Sales multiple retrived 
from Damodaran Scale
Value(EV/Sales_Ycharts)
Value of company using EV/Sales multiple retrived 
from Ycharts Scale
Debt year T Debt on balance sheet in year T - retrieved from Proff. Scale
Cash & Equivalents year T
Cash and cash equivalents on balance sheet in year T  -
retrieved from Proff. Scale
Value(before discount)
The value of the company based on the chosen 
multiples. Scale
Conducted first sale
Coded '1' if the company has conducted their first 
commercial sale Ordinal
Iliquidity discount
Illiquidity discount in accordance with Silber (see 
appendix 6). Scale
Company Value
The estimated company value after the illiquidity 
discount is applied. Scale
Company Value Transformed 1+ln(Company Value) Dependent variable Scale
Human Resources
Team Technical Experience
Coded as either 'student', 'Forskningsassistent', 'PhD. 
kandidat', 'Amanuensis', 'Førsteamanuensis', 
'Professor', 'Departementsleder eller 
forskningsinstituttleder', or 'Institutt professor', based 
on the highest academic rank amongst the founders. Ordinal
Team Technical 
Experience(integer)
Coded '1' if the company has technical experience in 
the founding team Ordinal
Team Marketing Experience
Coded '1' if the company has marketing experience in 
the founding team Ordinal
Team Financial Experience
Coded '1' if the company has financial experience in 
the founding team Ordinal
Team ManagementExperience
Coded '1' if the company has management experience 
in the founding team Ordinal
Team Startup Experience
Coded '1' if the company has startup experience in the 
founding team Ordinal
Team Industry Experience
Coded '1' if the company has industry experience in 
the founding team Ordinal
Team Heterogeneity
The sum of the binary variables 'Team technical 
experience(integer)', 'Team marketing experience', 
'Team financial experience', 'Team management 
experience', 'Team startup experience',  and 'Team 
industy experience'. Scale
Team Heterogeneity Transformed 1+ln(Team Heterogeneity) Independent variable Scale
Inventor on Team
Coded '1' if at least one of the technology inventors 
are on the fouding team Independent variable Ordinal
Inventor Renownedness
The total citaton count up until 2 years after the 
company is founded of all founders as calculate by 
Google Scholar. Scale
Inventor Renownedness 
Transformed 1+ln(Inventor Renownedness) Independent variable Scale
7Social Resources
Parent Institution Name of parent university Nominal
Parent Ranking
Ranking of parent university in accordance with 
Webometrics Scale
Quality of parent university Inverse of parent ranking (1000/parent_rank) Independent variable Scale
Team Years of Employment at 
Parent
The total number of years the founders have 
worked/researched at the parent university up until 2 
years after the company was founded. Independent variable Scale
Financial Resources
Investor Capital
Coded '1' if the company has received investor 
funding during its first two years of operations
Technological Resources
#Patents Filed
The total number of patents filed during or prior to 2 
years after the company being founded where the 
company is listed as assignee Scale
#Claims on Patents Filed The total number of citations on all filed patents Scale
Name of patents filed The names on filed patents Nominal
#Patents Published
The total number of patents published during or prior 
to 2 years after the company being founded where the 
company is listed as assignee Scale
# Claims on Patents Published The total number of citations on all published patents Scale
Name of patents published The names on published patents Nominal
Number of patents The sum of #patents filed and #patents published Scale
Number of patents Transformed 1-1/(1+Number of patents) Independent variable Scale
8Appendix 4 - Descriptives
Descriptives After Transformation
N
M
inimum
M
aximum
M
ean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Variable
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Std. Error
Statistic
Std. Error
Statistic
df
Sig.
Company Value (transformed)
63
0
20,0407519
6,88383237
8,359834129
69,88682667
0,42352599
0,30158857
-1,797988
0,59484062
0,68992287
63
3,0035E-10
Human Resources
Inventor on founding team
63
0
1
0,88888889
0,316793976
0,100358423
-2,5356501
0,30158857
4,57377049
0,59484062
0,36396492
63
4,8484E-15
Inventor renownedness (transformed)
63
0
9,7217858
4,27373482
3,192697293
10,193316
-0,1792133
0,30158857
-1,3975119
0,59484062
0,88828618
63
3,3944E-05
Team heterogeneity (transformed)
63
0
1,94591015
1,05732398
0,411302857
0,16917004
-0,0257955
0,30158857
0,02511675
0,59484062
0,90809878
63
0,00018432
Social Resources
Ties to parent university
63
0
54
17,3968254
13,70959128
187,952893
0,67046479
0,30158857
-0,4408559
0,59484062
0,92285007
63
0,00072782
Parent university quality (transformed)
63
0,1496334
14,7058824
5,98954308
4,867322128
23,6908247
0,58323494
0,30158857
-0,5790366
0,59484062
0,83427262
63
6,621E-07
Financial Resources
Investor capital
63
0
1
0,20634921
0,407934615
0,16641065
1,48689852
0,30158857
0,21672636
0,59484062
0,4968968
63
2,3041E-13
Technological Resources
Number of patents (transformed)
63
0
0,99047619
0,26945744
0,390995877
0,152877776
0,82089374
0,30158857
-1,2697309
0,59484062
0,64416791
63
4,3562E-11
Control Variables
Company age
63
1
13
8,36507937
3,456184673
11,94521249
-0,4935447
0,30158857
-0,8438655
0,59484062
0,93212978
63
0,0018282
M
arket size (M
USD)
63
25081,0071
1415745,12
429837,388
368827,953
1,36034E+11
1,3648623
0,30158857
1,46986127
0,59484062
0,83320955
63
6,1759E-07
Descriptives Before Transformation
N
M
inimum
M
aximum
M
ean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Variable
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Std. Error
Statistic
Std. Error
Statistic
df
Sig.
Company Value 
63
0
505345000
30847241,8
97404974,1
9,48773E+15
4,05987085
0,30158857
16,0063395
0,59484062
0,34808519
63
3,1831E-15
Human Resources
Inventor on founding team
63
0
1
0,88888889
0,316793976
0,100358423
-2,5356501
0,30158857
4,57377049
0,59484062
0,36396492
63
4,8484E-15
Inventor renownedness 
63
68
6683
934,333333
1512,818551
2288619,968
2,29378973
0,30158857
5,47323294
0,59484062
0,61269135
63
1,2705E-11
Team heterogeneity 
63
0
104
3,41269841
13,24780556
175,5043523
7,29071394
0,30158857
55,9121035
0,59484062
0,2389605
63
2,1285E-16
Social Resources
Ties to parent university
63
0
54
17,3968254
13,70959128
187,952893
0,67046479
0,30158857
-0,4408559
0,59484062
0,92285007
63
0,00072782
Parent university quality (1000/rank)
63
0
6
2,12698413
1,313602084
1,725550435
0,94886563
0,30158857
0,40611251
0,59484062
0,87110329
63
8,8208E-06
Financial Resources
Investor capital
63
0
1
0,20634921
0,407934615
0,16641065
1,48689852
0,30158857
0,21672636
0,59484062
0,4968968
63
2,3041E-13
Technological Resources
Number of patents
63
0
16676
1219,22222
2749,235527
7558295,982
3,80719126
0,30158857
17,061174
0,59484062
0,49515381
63
2,1806E-13
Control Variables
Company age
63
1
13
8,36507937
3,456184673
11,94521249
-0,4935447
0,30158857
-0,8438655
0,59484062
0,93212978
63
0,0018282
M
arket size (M
USD)
63
25081,0071
1415745,12
429837,388
368827,953
1,36034E+11
1,3648623
0,30158857
1,46986127
0,59484062
0,83320955
63
6,1759E-07
Skewness
Kurtosis
Shapiro-W
ilk
Skewness
Kurtosis
Shapiro-W
ilk
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Appendix 5 - SPSS Model Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Adjusted R 
SquareR SquareR df1F Change
R Square 
Change
Change Statistics
1
2 73.183.2236.59086.378.469.685b
29.751.2457.38255.220.245.495a
Model
Model Summaryc
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age_at_T, Market Size_Ycharts
b. Predictors: (Constant), Age_at_T, Market Size_Ycharts, Team_Heterogeneity_Transformed, 
Inventor_Renownedness_Transformed, Investor_capital, Quality_Of_Parent_Transformed, 
Inventor_on_Team, Number_of_patents_Transformed, Ties_To_Parent
c. Dependent Variable: Company_Value_Transformed
Sig. F Changedf2
Durbin-
Watson
Change Statistics
1
2 1.837.00753
.00060
Model
Model Summaryc
c. Dependent Variable: Company_Value_Transformed
Page 1
Method
Variables 
Removed
Variables 
Entered
1
2 Enter.Team_
Heterogeneity
_Transformed
, Inventor_
Renownednes
s_
Transformed, 
Investor_
capital, 
Quality_Of_
Parent_
Transformed, 
Inventor_on_
Team, 
Number_of_
patents_
Transformed, 
Ties_To_
Parenta
Enter.Age_at_T, 
Market 
Size_Ychartsa
Model
Variables Entered/Removedb
a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: 
Company_Value_Transformed
Page 1
!10!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sig.FMean Squaredf
Sum of 
Squares
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
1
2
624332.983
43.439532302.292
.000b5.194225.63292030.691
624332.983
54.502603270.124
.000a9.751531.43021062.859
Model
ANOVAc
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age_at_T, Market Size_Ycharts
b. Predictors: (Constant), Age_at_T, Market Size_Ycharts, 
Team_Heterogeneity_Transformed, Inventor_Renownedness_Transformed, 
Investor_capital, Quality_Of_Parent_Transformed, Inventor_on_Team, 
Number_of_patents_Transformed, Ties_To_Parent
c. Dependent Variable: Company_Value_Transformed
Page 1
Partial 
CorrelationSig.tBeta In
Inventor_on_Team
Team_Heterogeneity_
Transformed
Number_of_patents_
Transformed
Quality_Of_Parent_
Transformed
Investor_capital
Inventor_Renownedness_
Transformed
Ties_To_Parent
1
.374.0033.098.343a
.183.1581.428.164a
-.084.522-.644-.077a
.286.0262.288.268a
.278.0302.223.257a
.263.0402.095.231a
.136.2961.054.122a
Model
Excluded Variables b
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Age_at_T, Market Size_Ycharts
b. Dependent Variable: Company_Value_Transformed
Minimum 
ToleranceVIFTolerance
Collinearity Statistics
Inventor_on_Team
Team_Heterogeneity_
Transformed
Number_of_patents_
Transformed
Quality_Of_Parent_
Transformed
Investor_capital
Inventor_Renownedness_
Transformed
Ties_To_Parent
1
.8961.116.896
.9381.066.938
.8871.126.888
.8601.163.860
.8811.135.881
.9791.021.979
.9431.060.943
Model
Excluded Variables b
b. Dependent Variable: Company_Value_Transformed
Page 1
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orrelations  
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NStd. DeviationMeanMaximumMinimum
Predicted Value
Std. Predicted Value
Standard Error of 
Predicted Value
Adjusted Predicted Value
Residual
Std. Residual
Stud. Residual
Deleted Residual
Stud. Deleted Residual
Mahal. Distance
Cook's Distance
Centered Leverage Value 63.069.143.330.046
63.035.022.176.000
634.2878.85720.4522.878
631.033.0002.360-2.237
637.39411-.0416616.86695-15.21210
631.017-.0032.265-2.157
63.925.0002.035-2.016
636.09375.0000013.41070-13.28685
635.990376.925526.3584-5.2705
63.5452.5703.8751.645
631.000.0002.814-2.013
635.723036.883822.9894-4.6374
Residuals Statisticsa
a. Dependent Variable: Company_Value_Transformed
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Appendix 6 - Normality of Residuals 
 
Sig.dfStatistic Sig.dfStatistic
Shapiro-WilkKolmogorov-Smirnov a
Standardized Residual .39563.980.200*63.072
Tests of Normality
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
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Regression Standardized Residual
3210-1-2-3
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2
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Histogram
Dependent Variable: Company_Value_Transformed
 
Mean = 3.23E-16 
Std. Dev. = 0.925 
N = 63
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Appendix 7 - Illiquidity Discount 
 
Silber’s (1991) equation: 
LN(RPRS)=4,33+ 0,036*LN(REV) - 0,142*LN (RBRT) + 0,174*(DERN) + 
0,332*DCUST 
 
RPRS: Relative price of restricted stock expressed in percentage terms    
                      [(pr/pc)*100] 
REV: Firms revenues in MUSD 
RBRT: Size of the restricted block of shares relative to total common stock (in per 
cent, and equals 100 in our case of private firms).  
DERN: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has positive earnings. 
DCUST: Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a customer relationship between 
investor and firm.  
 
Calculated illiquidity discount in valuation model: 
 
   
